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INTRODUCTION

S

ince the early 1990s, the issue of fiscal transparency has attracted
increasing attention from international institutions, governments,
and nongovernment actors concerned with budgets and fiscal policy
reform. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) has described the budget as “[t]he single most important policy document of governments, where policy objectives are reconciled and
implemented in concrete terms.”1 In the last decade, the OECD and International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have embarked on significant programs to develop standards and codes of conduct on budget transparency
and to assess country practices in this area.2 Nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) have developed their own indices to measure and compare fiscal transparency internationally.3 At the domestic level, where
budgeting takes place, some governments have enacted legislation to
formalize their commitments to fiscal disclosure.
This Article seeks to address two major questions that have received
very limited attention from researchers: (1) What is fiscal transparency
1. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, 1(3) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2001, at 7 [hereinafter OECD Best Practices].
2. See id.; INT’L MONETARY FUND, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICES ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507c.pdf [hereinafter 2007 IMF CODE]. See generally INT’L MONETARY FUND, MANUAL ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/manual.pdf
[hereinafter 2001 IMF MANUAL]; INT’L MONETARY FUND, MANUAL ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101907m.pdf
[hereinafter 2007 IMF MANUAL].
3. In the late 1990s the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (“IDASA”) collaborated with the International Budget Project (“IBP”), based in Washington, D.C., to develop a survey questionnaire for evaluating budget transparency that was then applied to
South Africa. See ALTA FÖLSCHER ET AL., TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE
BUDGET PROCESS—SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY REPORT (Dec. 2000). This methodology
has been adapted for studies of several other countries. See Int’l Budget P’ship, Index of
Budget Transparency in Five Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, Jan. 10, 2002, http://internationalbudget.org/resources/LAbudtrans.pdf [hereinafter Index of Five Latin American Countries]. The Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, a nongovernment organization based in Washington, D.C., launched its Open
Budget Index in 2006 with the goal of scrutinizing fiscal transparency practices in different countries around the world. Open Budget Initiative, About the Open Budget Initiative, http://www.openbudgetindex.org/index.cfm?fa=about (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
For information on the history and goals of the Open Budget Index, see Int’l Budget
P’ship, Transparency and Participation in the Budget Process: Why Focus on Budget
Transparency and Participation, http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/in
dex.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Transparency and Participation in the
Budget Process].
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for? That is, what different meanings can be ascribed to this concept, and
what political economic purposes does it advance? And, (2) what is the
role of law and legal institutions in securing different visions of fiscal
transparency?
On the first point, a central argument of this Article is that the concept
of fiscal transparency is not a neutral public good, but one that is open to
a range of definitions that serve different interests. As has frequently
been said about taxation, the (re)distribution of benefits and burdens
through budgeting or fiscal policy processes is inherently political.4 Sustainable budgeting requires negotiation of a legitimate, fair, and relatively stable fiscal compact or bargain.5
This Article offers a critical analysis of the meaning and purposes of
fiscal transparency in light of developing international norms. It is argued that fiscal transparency norms as they are currently promulgated by
most governments and international institutions focus primarily on fiscal
discipline and on providing information to establish credibility for financial markets, international lenders, and aid donors. While these aspects of
transparency are obviously important, they tend to ignore the political
nature of the budget in both domestic and international contexts. In particular, this Article examines whether and to what extent fiscal transparency norms enable distributive justice and democratic participation in
budget decision making by legislative and civil society actors. We find
that these dimensions of transparency have been widely neglected in the
design of prevailing norms. As a result, we argue, the “best practices”
that currently dominate this field will be of limited help in generating the
political consensus needed to ensure equitable development. These distributional and democratic deficits should concern all of us, but may be
especially problematic for developing countries, for which issues of poverty reduction and economic sovereignty are most pressing. This Article
also examines some alternative definitions of fiscal transparency that
address these issues in a more meaningful way.
Regarding our second key question, the role of law or legal institutions
in securing different visions of fiscal transparency, we emphasize the
4. U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
SURVEY 1997: TRENDS AND POLICIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, at 64–65, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/256, U.N. Sales No. E/1997/50 (1997); Nicholas Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped
Countries Learn to Tax?, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 410, 418 (1963).
5. MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 181 (1988). See generally SVEN
STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
TO FINANCING THE MODERN STATE (1993); Mick Moore & Lise Rakner, Introduction: The
New Politics of Taxation and Accountability in Developing Countries, 33 INST. OF DEV.
STUD. BULL. 1 (2002).

800

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:3

potential importance of fiscal transparency norms in empowering citizens
to participate in establishing a fair and legitimate fiscal policy in their
country, both through their representatives in a democratic legislature
and more broadly. Here, we draw on theories of deliberative democracy
in which laws play the important role of establishing the rules of engagement in the decision-making process.6 As we see the budget as central to political decision making about taxing and spending, we advocate
for the expansion of budget transparency laws to fulfill this deliberative
role, and we identify the shortcomings of current fiscal codes and norms
in addressing transparency and accountability. We also inquire as to the
practical role that law has played thus far in the spread and reform of
budget transparency norms and in the establishment of “transparency” as
an identifiable measure of good governance (however it be defined). This
is a subset of a broader set of questions about the role of law in development.7 We examine the importance of the “rule of law” and “good governance” in the fiscal context and consider what role budget transparency laws might play in a particular country’s “development” process. We
identify a wide diversity of laws and practices concerning fiscal transparency in national and international contexts and ask to what extent it matters whether budget norms are “hard law” compared to “soft law” norms,
administrative practices, or market incentives.
The discussion of these overarching themes is organized into six Parts.
In Part I, we analyze the reasons why fiscal transparency has surfaced so
widely and insistently as a law reform issue at this particular juncture.
Part II tracks the paths and networks by which these norms have been
developed and transmitted globally, through initiatives at various international and domestic levels. Part III takes a closer look at the content of
fiscal transparency, according to the dominant model associated principally with the IMF. Part IV examines how various fiscal transparency
codes and statutes deal with (or ignore) issues of distributive impact and
politics. Part V analyzes democratic participation in the budget process.
Part VI concludes with a discussion of the implications of this analysis
for the broader project of “ruling the world,” including the role of law or
norms and the implications for national and global governance. Recog6. See generally Philip Pettit, Depoliticizing Democracy, 17 RATIO JURIS 52 (2004).
7. The relationship between law and development has begun to be critically analyzed by many scholars after nearly two decades of “law reform,” which has frequently
been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Kevin Davis & Michael Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 (2008);
David Kennedy, The ‘Rule of Law’ as Development, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING
COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 22 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kassaris
eds., 2003).
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nizing that nation states remain the primary actors in formulating fiscal
policy, we emphasize the need to design transnational fiscal norms that
foster inclusive, democratic institutions at the country level, although we
also identify the beginnings of an architecture that could provide an inclusionary framework for taxing and spending in the global context.
I. THE ROOTS OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY DISCOURSE
Budgeting is a process for organizing government fiscal activities and,
as such, it is as old as government taxing and spending. Prudence in fiscal management—in some commonsense way, matching expenditures to
revenues—is the essence of budgeting. Just as budgeting has a long tradition, the basic principle of fiscal transparency, the notion that governmental fiscal activities should be subject to public scrutiny, is not new. In
this context, a central purpose of budgeting has been to ensure a degree
of transparency, and therefore accountability, regarding the nature and
quantum of public spending and taxation.8 The institutional and procedural framework for raising, appropriating, spending, and accounting for
public funds is typically laid out in a country’s constitution and financial
management legislation, and supplemented by longstanding convention.
In many developing countries, the “organic finance laws” are based on
administrative practices that became entrenched during colonial times.
They have generally been in place for several decades, though in practice
these formal rules may not be fully implemented.9
In the last decade, the term “fiscal transparency” has obtained currency
as the banner for a host of policy initiatives designed to regularize budgeting practices and mandate the disclosure of specific information by
governments around the world. In this Part, we explore the roots of this
discourse on fiscal transparency, which has emerged so forcefully since
the mid-1990s. We suggest it is linked to two broader trends that have
affected both developed and developing countries: (i) the neoliberal turn
in economic policy, which emphasizes fiscal discipline, and (ii) the
movement to reform institutions to promote good governance.

8. See Aaron Wildavsky, A Budget for All Seasons? Why the Traditional Budget
Lasts, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 501, 502 (1978).
9. Mike Stevens, Institutional and Incentive Issues in Public Financial Management
Reform in Poor Countries 5 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 35106, 2004), available at
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/027
/000090341_20060207162350/Rendered/PDF/351060Institutional0issues.pdf.
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A. Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Discipline
As a defining aspect of the neoliberal turn in the 1980s, governments
lost authority as economic decision makers and were subjected in various
ways to more intensive forms of market discipline, in particular, reducing
budget deficits.10 This included the discipline of credit-rating agencies,
which directly impacted the cost to governments of financing a deficit,
and the discipline of market analysts, who influenced where mobile capital would be invested. In developing countries, such market pressures
were reinforced by explicit conditions imposed on concessional lending
and aid. A review of IMF-supported fiscal reforms during the 1990s indicates that their key elements were reducing government spending,
downsizing the State, shifting expenditures from current to capital accounts, and some provisions on safety net expenditures.11 In order to establish credibility with these increasingly powerful external audiences
and allow them to assess investment risks, governments had to be more
forthcoming with detailed information about country finances.
In developed countries, the constraints on government action in economic matters first became apparent in relation to monetary policy. Developed States have fashioned various methods of institutionalizing
monetary policy in such a way that, at least to some extent, it is taken out
of the hands of elected governments.12 This is commonly done by delegating the determination of interest rates to an independent central bank,
now also a key plank of IMF recommendations for developing countries,
because it is seen as a vital way to control inflation.13 Monetary policy
also may be implemented through controls on exchange rates imposed in
many developing countries (for example, countries may peg their curren10. See, e.g., Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The
Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 285 (1993) (identifying a
“shift” in the “locus of authority over macroeconomic issues” away from the Treasury
and Keynesian economics towards monetarism, cemented under Margaret Thatcher and
institutionalized through the 1980s and 1990s). See also Carl Emmerson, Chris Frayne &
Sarah Love, Updating the U.K.’s Code for Fiscal Stability (Inst. for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper No. 04/29, 2004).
11. Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries 4, Occasional
Paper No. 160, Mar. 31, 1998 (led by George T. Abed). See also Allen Schick, The Role
of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting, 3(3) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2003, at 7–8.
12. Emmerson, Frayne & Love , supra note 10, at 4.
13. The IMF monitors monetary transparency and practices as well as fiscal transparency. In 1999, it released the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles. INT’L MONETARY FUND, CODE OF GOOD
PRACTICES ON TRANSPARENCY IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICIES: DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft/code/ [hereinafter IMF PRINCIPLES].
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cy to the U.S. dollar, or establish currency boards or capital import or
export limits). Governments sought to establish the independence of this
decision making, so as to credibly influence market expectations and
thus “create conditions favorable to that level of inflation being realized.”14 For our purposes, what is most interesting about this institutional transformation is the need for governments to establish “credibility”
with markets and their loss of authority as economic decision makers.15
New Zealand was a pioneer in legalizing central bank control over interest rates, during its massive economic liberalization in the 1980s. The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 established an independent bank
and a “transparent” process of implementing interest rates “without interference from Government, Treasury, or anybody else,” which was
claimed to have “no exact parallels anywhere else in the world.”16 Five
years later, the same philosophy was applied to fiscal policy:
[T]he key is transparency—indeed, chronologically it was the transparency in the Reserve Bank Act which inspired the idea of attempting
something similar for fiscal policy. Government’s hands are tied only
by the need to make policy intentions absolutely unambiguous to the
public—surely a fundamentally sound principle.17

Governments have not formally delegated their powers to set fiscal
policy as they have for monetary policy. However, in the last decade,
governments have placed a range of hard and soft law constraints on
their own fiscal decision making. Why governments—in particular,
elected governments—should agree to constrain themselves in this way
is not obvious.18 The evidence suggests that for fiscal policy, as for mon-

14. Id. See also 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing monetary policy
and central bank independence).
15. The financial crisis of 2008 and the global recession have shifted the balance of
authority back to government decision makers in the short-term. However, we suggest
that market mechanisms will remain dominant in the long-term.
16. Specifically, the goal of this Act was to “Muldoon-proof” monetary policy, a
reference to the previous long-standing Prime Minister of New Zealand. Donald T.
Brash, Governor of the Reserve Bank of N.Z., New Zealand’s Remarkable Reforms,
Address to the Fifth Annual Hayek Memorial Lecture at Institute of Economic Affairs,
London (June 4, 1996) [hereinafter Brash Speech] (also discussing the New Zealand
fiscal responsibility reforms in depth). Begun in 1955, the Institute of Economic Affairs
bills itself as rightwing and as “the U.K.’s original free-market think-tank.” Inst. of Econ.
Affairs, About the IEA, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=page&ID=23 (last visited
Apr. 8, 2009).
17. Brash Speech, supra note 16.
18. See Emmerson, Frayne & Love, supra note 10, at 4–6; Schick, supra note 11, at 8
(asking, “Why have democracies accepted or imposed fiscal limits on themselves, and
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etary policy, the desire to strengthen credibility vis-à-vis external audiences has been the driving factor and credibility regarding deficit constraint a constant theme.19 Trends to increase legislative control over
budgeting, including the imposition of fiscal rules and other measures,
have been identified as a reaction to concerns about “precarious” fiscal
balances and about “losing the confidence of world credit markets.”20
Schick claims that, prior to World War II, “virtually all democratic
countries embraced the balanced budget rule, including some that often
breached the rule or did not have any legal constraint on unbalanced
budgets.”21 More recently, many States legislated fiscal caps that expressly require a balanced budget or place limits on permissible spending
or borrowing, sometimes with schedules for deficit elimination. Examples include the expenditure ceilings introduced in many developed
countries, such as Finland, Japan, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.22 In
the European Union, the Maastricht Stability and Growth Pact (“Pact”)
was established in order to stabilize and support the euro currency union.23 It requires Member States to “avoid excessive government deficits” defined as planned or actual deficits above three percent of gross
domestic product (“GDP”) and government debt above sixty percent of
GDP.24 Article 104 of the Pact sets out the consequences for Member
States that breach this requirement, which escalate in severity: completion of a confidential Commission report, a Council recommendation,
publicity requirements, constraints on borrowing from the European Investment Bank, a required deposit with the Community, and fines.25 A
why should we expect these limits to be effective when they run counter to the preferences of voters and politicians?”).
19. There have been a few suggestions to make fiscal policy “more like” monetary
policy—a lever to be pulled in response to economic conditions—and thereby take some
of the “politics” out of setting tax rates. See Nicholas Gruen, Greater Independence for
Fiscal Institutions, 1(1) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2001, at 89. So far, this path has not
been taken up by either the international institutions or country governments.
20. Paul Posner & Chung-Keun Park, Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process:
Recent Trends and Innovations, 7(3) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2007, at 83; Schick, supra
note 11.
21. Schick, supra note 11, at 15.
22. Isabelle Joumard et al., Enhancing the Cost Effectiveness of Public Spending:
Experience in OECD Countries, 37 OECD ECON. STUD. 2004, at 120–23.
23. The Pact (establishing the European Community) creates a framework under
which Member States “shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern” and hence submit themselves to “multilateral surveillance” by the European Commission and through it, by each other. Maastricht Treaty art. 103, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 1992
C191/6.
24. Id. art 104(c); Protocol annexed to the Pact, art. 1.
25. Id. art 104(c).
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set of detailed procedural norms concerning data release and acquiescence to economic surveillance is laid down in resolutions, codes of conduct, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council.26
However, experience with hard fiscal caps during the 1990s was often
negative. Many studies demonstrate that these numerical restraints were
frequently too rigid and were ignored, or worse, that they encouraged
gaming, as governments tried to hide noncompliance through accounting
changes or off-budget spending.27 The IMF has criticized the “perverse
incentives” that such rules may generate if they are not backed by transparent reporting “such that non-compliance can be easily detected and
addressed.”28
The IMF Code does not advocate the adoption of substantive fiscal
caps. Instead, the Code discusses such fiscal rules as one possible element
of an overall policy of fiscal transparency, stating that this discussion
“should not be taken as an endorsement of the practices themselves.”29
26. All of the resolutions and legal texts on the Stability and Growth Pact are available
at European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/other_pages/other_pages12638_en.htm (last visited May 7, 2009).
27. At least some of this research took place inside the IMF, whose preoccupation
with budget deficits is indicated by Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti. See Alberto
Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process, 86 AM. ECON. REV.
401, 403 (1996); Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, The Political Economy of Budget
Deficits (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4637, 1994), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4637. See also James L. Chan, Major Federal Budget Laws
of the United States, in BUDGET DEFICITS AND DEBT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 17 (Siamack Shojai ed., 1999); 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 40–42; INT’L MONETARY
FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at 40 (1998) [hereinafter IMF 1998 ANNUAL REPORT];
Miguel Braun & Nicolás Gadano, What Are Fiscal Rules for? A Critical Analysis of the
Argentine Experience, 91 CEPAL REV. 53 (2007); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.,
Fiscal Sustainability: The Contribution of Fiscal Rules, 72 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
117 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/2/2483962.pdf [hereinafter
OECD, Fiscal Sustainability]; Lisa Philipps, The Rise of Balanced Budget Laws in Canada: Legislating Fiscal (Ir)responsibility, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 681 (1996); Charles
Wyplosz, Fiscal Policy: Institutions Versus Rules, 191 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 70, 74–76
(2005); Allan Drazen, Fiscal Rules from a Political Economy Perspective 13–17 (June 9,
2002) (Paper presented at the IMF World Bank Conference on Rules-Based Fiscal Policy
in Emerging Market Economies, Oaxaca, Mexico, Feb. 14–16, 2002); George Kopits &
Jon Craig, Transparency in Government Operations 2 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Occasional
Paper No. 158, 1998).
28. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 41. Similarly, the OECD suggests that more
coercive fiscal rules, such as balanced budget laws or spending caps, may be ineffective
unless accompanied by transparency rules that prevent governments from hiding certain
expenditures off budget. Joumard et al., supra note 22.
29. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 14–15.
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Even the Pact’s strict three-percent fiscal deficit rule is dominated in
practice by the various “soft” procedures for enforcement; the Council of
the European Union uses these procedures primarily to enforce increased
transparency, medium-term budgeting frameworks, and expenditure
management processes among Member States.30 Information about national fiscal rules and institutions, including monitoring mechanisms and
multi-annual fiscal frameworks, must be reported annually to the EU institutions.31 The Council has “recall[ed] the importance of domestic ownership, including the appropriate involvement of national Parliaments,”
but the main audience for these significant “transparency” obligations
seems to be the Commission and the Council; the finance ministers and
economic policy makers of the other Member States; and financial markets.
The notion of transparency does not on its face commit governments to
restrain spending or deficits. However, as we show in Part II below, the
need to establish credibility in the eyes of financial markets, donors, and
investors has been a key driver of transparency initiatives. As one IMF
staff member explained when promoting fiscal transparency to an audience consisting largely of representatives from developing countries:
In fiscal policy perhaps nothing matters quite so much these days as
what the financial markets think you are doing and how well you are
doing it, and to add to the financial markets I think you increasingly
have to take into account the fact that the donors like to know what it is
that a country is doing and how well it is doing it.32

While prudent fiscal management has a commonsense appeal, what is
less obvious on the face of the transparency debate are the constraints on
taxation which, when combined with the spending constraints, have the
ideological goal of restricting the overall size of government. Although
the analogy between government and household budgeting is often made,
there is a key difference: a government’s overall budget constraint is not
set by any objective or external standard. What a government can raise in
resources is limited only by its capacity and desire to do so. The budget
constraint is itself a set of political choices, capabilities, and distributional goals. In developed countries, there has been a trend towards reduction
30. Press Release, Council of the European Union (Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/council-october-2007_en.pdf [hereinafter EU
Press Release].
31. Id. at 10.
32. Barry Potter, Address at the Second Conference on the International Budget Project: The IMF Transparency Code (Feb. 23, 1999), available at http://www.international
budget.org/conference/2nd/imf.htm.
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of taxes on capital and on mobile labor since the beginning of the 1980s,
although overall revenue collections have remained high. In developing
countries, the trend is more complex: it is accepted that tax collections in
these countries need to be increased so as to enable proper provision by
government, but a combination of economic globalization (especially the
mobility of capital) and domestic distributional politics puts great pressure on the ability of States to do so. We have written about the focus on
fiscal deficits and the politics of tax reform elsewhere;33 however, it remains an essential part of the neoliberal turn to which fiscal transparency
norms can, in part, be traced.
B. Fiscal Transparency and Good Governance
The second major impetus for the new discourse on fiscal transparency
came from changing ideas about governance that affected developing
and developed countries in different ways. In the late 1990s, development theorists and agencies began to emphasize the need to support institutional reforms or “good governance” in developing countries, as well as
to strengthen initiatives to reduce poverty and address the social side of
development. These ideas took hold in the wake of widespread dissatisfaction with the neoliberal model, particularly the economic and political
failure of structural adjustment programs in many developing countries.
The U.N. Millennium Declaration of 2000 reflected these shifting attitudes and laid out specific targets for reducing the number of people living in extreme poverty and other measurable improvements in human
welfare.34 The U.N. Financing for Development process examined how
resources can be made available to achieve these goals.35 In 2001, a highlevel panel chaired by Ernesto Zedillo offered a series of Recommenda33. See Lisa Philipps, Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of
Technical Knowledge in Fiscal Law and Policy, 11 CAN. J. L. & SOC. 141 (1996) [hereinafter Philipps, Discursive Defecits]; Lisa Philipps, Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal
Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111
(2000); Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax
Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (2003) [hereinafter Stewart, Global Trajectories]; Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform, 2 BRIT. TAX REV. 146 (2004).
34. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2
(Sept. 18, 2000). Notably, the Declaration states that creating “an environment . . . conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty . . . depends on []good governance within each country . . . at the international level” as well as on “transparency in
the financial, monetary and trading systems.” Id. art. III(12)–(13).
35. See generally International Conference on Financing for Development, Mar. 18–25,
2002, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, U.N. Doc A/CONF.198/11
(June 22, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf.
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tions (“Zedillo Report”).36 The panel emphasized the need for public investments in education, health, nutrition, and other basic social programs:
Financing an adequate level of social public expenditure while limiting
budget deficits calls for substantial tax revenues. Most countries of the
developing world must undertake significant tax reforms if they are to
raise the additional revenue that they need.37

The Zedillo Report further stated that developing countries themselves
bear the primary responsibility for achieving growth and equitable development, in part by “creating the conditions that make it possible to
secure the needed financial resources for investment.”38 These conditions
include “[f]irst and foremost . . . good governance that commands the
consent of the governed, and effective and impartial rule of law—
including relentless combat of corruption . . . .”39 Budget transparency
initiatives can be seen as part of this good governance agenda aimed at
securing resources for development. As we discuss in Part V below, a
second element of “governance” reform in both developing and developed countries has been an increase in consultation on policy reform and
its implementation, a trend that can been seen as both a logical consequence of increased transparency or information sharing and that has also
developed as part of broader efforts to improve expenditure and tax policy outcomes. In sum, fiscal transparency laws are part of the shift to governance in the global context of fiscal reform for development.

36. U.N. High-Level Panel on Fin. for Dev., Report of the High-Level Panel on Fin.
for Dev., Delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/1000 (2001), available at
http://www.un.org/reports/financing/full_report.pdf [hereinafter Zedillo Report]. The Zedillo Report was followed by a major U.N. Conference on Financing for Development.
See International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, Mar.
18–20, 2002, Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development,
U.N. Doc A/CONF.198/11 (2002). The Follow-up International Conference on Financing
for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus was held in
Doha, Qatar from November 29 to December 2, 2008. Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey
Consensus, Doha, Qatar, Nov. 29−Dec. 2, Doha Declaration on Financing for Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1 (Dec. 2, 2008).
37. Zedillo Report, supra note 36, at 5.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id.

2009]

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY

809

II. THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS
A. International Initiatives
This Part tracks the emergence and spread of budget transparency
norms since the mid-1990s through the interaction of transnational “soft
law” with more conventional legal forms at the country level. While international economic agencies have played a major role in this process,
we find that they in turn have been influenced by government practices
in certain developed countries, notably New Zealand. The normative underpinning of international agency codes is often obscured by the apparently neutral, procedural language of fiscal transparency. We also draw
attention to the efforts of certain NGOs to reformulate budget transparency norms in order to advance an alternative fiscal politics in which the
values of social equality and democratic legitimacy are more heavily
weighted.
1. The IMF
In previous work, Stewart has documented the rising influence of international financial institutions and their affiliated experts over domestic
tax reform agendas, especially, but not only, in developing countries.40 A
similar pattern of transfer from the international to the domestic level is
clearly evident in the spread of fiscal transparency norms, and the IMF
has taken the lead role in this process.
The IMF’s work on fiscal transparency evolved directly out of its efforts to promote budget discipline as a cornerstone of worldwide economic policy. By 1996, however, the IMF had begun to stress that reforms to promote good governance, the rule of law, and public sector
accountability were also needed in many countries to create conditions
for the success of its economic policy prescriptions.41 At this early stage

40. Stewart, Global Trajectories, supra note 33; Miranda Stewart, Tax Policy Transfer to Developing Countries: Politics, Institutions and Experts, in GLOBAL DEBATES
ABOUT TAXATION 182 (Holger Nehring & Florian Schui eds., 2007) [hereinafter Stewart,
Tax Policy Transfers]; Stewart & Jogarajan, supra note 33. See also Allison Christians,
Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 331 (2007) (on
the OECD).
41. See Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the Interim Committee
of the Board of Governors of the Internationall Monetary Fund, No. 96/49 (Sept. 29,
1996), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1996/pr9649.htm [hereinafter
IMF Press Release 96/49]; Int’l Monetary Fund, Good Governance: The IMF’s Role 3−4
(Aug. 1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govern.pdf
[hereinafter The IMF’s Role] (identifying issues of budget process and management as
central to the IMF’s mandate and expertise).
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of the governance revolution, the IMF advocated fiscal transparency
primarily as a means of shoring up fiscal discipline and improving a
country’s credibility with private investors. A critical 1996 declaration
restated the IMF’s longstanding view that countries should aim for
“budget balance and strengthened fiscal discipline in a multi-year
framework” and added the following:
Continued fiscal imbalances and excessive public indebtedness, and the
upward pressures they put on global real interest rates, are threats to financial stability and durable growth. It is essential to enhance the
transparency of fiscal policy by persevering with efforts to reduce offbudget transactions and quasi-fiscal deficits.42

The link between transparency and fiscal restraint was further emphasized in an influential study paper by two senior members of the IMF
Fiscal Affairs Department:
Timely publication of a clearly presented budget document makes it
easier for the market to evaluate the government’s intentions and allows
the market itself to impose a constructive discipline on the government.
Transparency increases the political risk of unsustainable policies, whereas the lack thereof means that fiscal profligacy can go undetected
longer than it otherwise would.43

Initially the IMF sought to encourage fiscal transparency by incorporating governance concerns into its existing programs of country surveillance, technical advice, and loan conditionality.44 In carrying out these
long-standing functions, IMF staff were to impress upon country authorities the “potential risk that poor governance could adversely affect market
confidence and, in turn, reduce private capital in-flows and investment.”45 In 1997, the IMF moved to formalize its guidance on fiscal
transparency in a detailed set of standards. This decision flowed directly
from the Asian financial crisis and the sense of urgency it created about
restoring market confidence.46 At a meeting in October 1997, executive
directors debated the merits of having staff prepare a “brief manual of

42. IMF Press Release 96/49, supra note 41 (emphasis added).
43. Kopits & Craig, supra note 27, at 2.
44. The IMF’s Role, supra note 41, at 6–9.
45. Id. at 7.
46. This decision was the result of the Asian financial crisis and the sense of urgency
it created about restoring market confidence. Murray Petrie, The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code: A Potentially Powerful New Anti-Corruption Tool 4 (paper presented at the 9th
International Anti-Corruption Conference, Durban, Oct. 10–15, 1999) [hereinafter Petrie,
The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code].
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good practices for fiscal transparency.”47 While the report of this discussion indicates that some directors had reservations, the staff was instructed to proceed, and the IMF’s first Code of Good Practices on Fiscal
Transparency was approved in April 1998 (“Code”).48 Revised versions
of the Code were published in 2001 and 2007, along with the extensive
Manual on Fiscal Transparency (“Manual”), which provides detailed
guidance to assist with “practical implementation.”49
On publishing its first Code in 1998, the IMF stated the purposes of
fiscal transparency more broadly than in earlier documents:
The underlying rationale was that fiscal transparency could lead to betterinformed public debate about the design and results of fiscal policy,
make governments more accountable for the implementation of fiscal
policy, and thereby promote good governance, strengthen credibility,
and mobilize popular support for sound macroeconomic policies.50

The IMF’s interest in promoting public debate must be read skeptically,
we argue, in light of its fundamental policy orientation towards fiscal
discipline. Its early discussions of transparency show that the driving
purpose was not to facilitate more informed and inclusive political bargaining over budgetary decisions, but rather to help ensure that countries
would stick to an IMF-approved set of fiscal policies, even in the face of
domestic political protest.51
The resolution approving the Code noted that it “does not imply a legal
obligation on members.”52 Nonetheless, the IMF has taken concerted
47. IMF 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27.
48. Id.; Press Release, Int’l Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the Interim Committee
of the Board of Governors of the Internationall Monetary Fund, No. 98/14 (Apr. 16,
1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/pr9814.htm [hereinafter
IMF Press Release 98/14].
49. Int’l Monetary Fund, Factsheet: How Does the IMF Encourage Greater Fiscal
Transparency?, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fiscal.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2009) [hereinafter IMF Factsheet]. See also 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2; INT’L
MONETARY FUND, FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, GUIDE ON RESOURCE REVENUE TRANSPARENCY
(2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101907g.pdf.
50. IMF 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 27.
51. For example, in their leading paper on fiscal transparency, Kopits and Craig explained its role in quelling popular protest as follows:
Although fiscal transparency cannot guarantee consensus, there have been episodes (including recent ones) where a failure to prepare the population, through
adequate and candid explanation, for the removal of a critical subsidy or of a
labor market regulation has led to major unrest and jeopardized the improved
economic performance sought by those measures.
Kopits & Craig, supra note 27, at 2.
52. IMF Press Release 98/14, supra note 48.
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steps to encourage compliance. As a result, the Code now exerts significant normative pressure on policy makers in many countries. The IMF’s
main implementation vehicle is the fiscal Report on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (“fiscal ROSC”). This is a module on fiscal policy
incorporated into the ROSC process which is applied generally by the
IMF to evaluate country compliance with a range of norms and standard.53 For example, in its 2001 fiscal ROSC on Brazil, the IMF commented favorably on the country’s improved fiscal management and
noted that “[t]he cornerstone of these achievements has been the enactment in May 2000 of the Fiscal Responsibility Law which sets out for all
levels of government fiscal rules designed to ensure medium-term fiscal
sustainability, and strict transparency requirements to underpin the effectiveness and credibility of such rules.”54 Formally, fiscal ROSCs are voluntary, as countries must request an assessment by the IMF, and they are
published only by consent.55 While many developed countries have undergone the process, participation has been especially strong among developing countries seeking better capital market access, in part because
the IMF’s published reports are used by credit-rating agencies and private analysts to gauge investment risk.56 Moreover, the IMF indicated
that it has sometimes incorporated the recommendations of fiscal ROSCs
into loan conditionality for particular countries.57 The decision to undergo or comply with the results of a fiscal ROSC cannot be seen as equally
voluntary for all countries.
It is our view that, globally, the IMF Code is the dominant model and
it has had pervasive influence via several channels. The normtransmitting capacity of the Code has been magnified by the work of other
transnational players in both the public and private sectors. This includes
53. See 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 8–12.
54. Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Brazil: Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)—Fiscal Transparency Module 1, IMF Country Report No.
01/217 (Dec. 2001).
55. By 2003, the IMF reported that “[fifty-four] fiscal ROSCs had been completed, of
which [forty-eight] were published on the IMF website.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL
AFFAIRS DEP’T, ASSESSING AND PROMOTING FISCAL TRANSPARENCY: A REPORT ON PROGRESS 4 (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://imf.org/external/np/pdr/sac/2003/030503s2.pdf
[hereinafter REPORT ON PROGRESS]. A more recent document indicates that “[a]s of
March 2009, [eighty-eight] countries from all regions and levels of economic development had posted their fiscal transparency ROSCs on the IMF’s Standards and Codes web
page.” IMF Factsheet, supra note 49.
56. REPORT ON PROGRESS, supra note 55, at 9, 17.
57. Id. at 12–13. One example is Argentina, where a new Fiscal Responsibility Law
was enacted in 2004, as a direct response to IMF requirements for institutional reform.
See Braun & Gadano, supra note 27, at 60–62.
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the World Bank, which has sometimes collaborated with the IMF in
completing fiscal ROSC reports and has relied on them in its own work,
in particular in developing aid and loan expenditure accountability mechanisms.58 The Code has also been promoted by the Financial Stability
Forum (“FSF”), a group comprised of financial regulators from several
developed countries, international financial institutions, and standardsetting bodies, including the IMF.59 The FSF has urged “market practitioners to take further account, when making lending and investment
decisions, of jurisdictions’ observance of standards.”60 Private sector investment analysts do appear to use the Code in this manner, both by relying on IMF reports of country compliance and by applying the Code
independently to evaluate fiscal transparency in countries for which no
fiscal ROSC is available.61 Furthermore, there is some evidence that the
Code is influencing the way donor countries deliver foreign aid. For example, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
uses the Code along with other international standards to help it assess
the risks of delivering aid directly through a government’s central budget, as contrasted with aid tied to specific projects or administered by
NGOs.62 The prospect of securing less conditional forms of international
58. See World Bank, Poverty Reduction & Econ. Mgmt. Network & Int’l Monetary
Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Bank/Fund Collaboration on Public Expenditure Issues 20,
Board Report No. 25763 (Feb. 14, 2003), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/
publicsector/pe/BankFundPERCollaboration.pdf. World Bank analysts have also used the
2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, as a benchmark for evaluating budget processes in developed and developing countries. See, e.g., Zhicheng Li Swift, Managing the Effects of Tax
Expenditures on National Budgets 26–27 (World Bank Pol’y Research, Working Paper
No. 3927, 2006). Note also the endorsement by G7 Finance Ministers in 1999. See generally World Bank & IMF, Bank/Fund Collaboration on Public Expenditure Issues 20,
IBRD Report No. 25763 (Feb. 14, 2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/04/25/000094946_03041604014622/
Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
59. See Financial Stability Forum, History, http://www.fsforum.org/about/history.htm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2009). See also FIN. STABILITY FORUM, UPDATE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FSF’S RECOMMENDATIONS: REPORT BY THE FSF CHAIRMAN TO THE G8
FINANCE MINISTERS (2008), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0806.pdf.
60. Fin. Stability Forum, Follow-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of
Standards, Sept. 6, 2001, http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0109a.htm.
61. Murray Petrie, Promoting Fiscal Transparency: The Complementary Roles of the
IMF, Financial Markets, and Civil Society 6–14 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 03/199, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03199.pdf
[hereinafter Petrie, Promoting Fiscal Transparency].
62. See DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., MANAGING FIDUCIARY RISK WHEN PROVIDING DIRECT
BUDGET SUPPORT 8−10 (2002), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/pfma-fiduciary
risk.pdf. See also Norwegian Agency for Dev. Cooperation, Coordination of Budget Support Programs: Lessons from the Joint Macro-Financial Aid Program to Mozambique 5,
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aid thus provides another impetus for developing countries to adopt IMFdefined fiscal transparency norms in their domestic law and practice.
2. The OECD
Following the IMF’s lead, the OECD began work in 1999 on a set of
Best Practices for Budget Transparency (“OECD Best Practices”),
gleaned from the experience of member countries.63 The active involvement of both the IMF and the OECD indicates the global sweep of fiscal
transparency norms, encompassing developed and developing nations
alike. As explained in Part I, like the IMF, the OECD’s interest in this
subject is firmly rooted in its concerns about the prudence and sustainability of fiscal policy among its members. Though many OECD countries
reduced their large deficits during the 1990s, budget balances are clearly
at risk in the current financial crisis as well as because of the longer term
spending pressures associated with demographic aging, such as health
care and pensions.64 The OECD has predicted that the fiscal consequences of aging populations will be “severe” in virtually all its member
countries.65 From its perspective, the main purpose of transparency
measures is to encourage spending restraint by revealing “the true cost of
government activities.”66
The OECD Best Practices notes that some countries have legislated
fiscal rules while others have merely adopted policies or guidelines.67 It
strikes a more skeptical tone than the IMF about the value of law reform
per se, observing that “enforcing fiscal frameworks is a political economy
issue as well as a technical one.”68 The OECD explains that its description of best practices “are not meant to constitute a formal ‘standard’ for
budget transparency.”69 The OECD is not a funding body and does not
have the same types of leverage over its members as the IMF, in the
sense of imposing conditions on financial assistance. Nor does the
OECD formally report on country compliance with the OECD Best Practices. Nonetheless, one of the purposes of the document is clearly to encourage reform and convergence at the country level: “[t]he Best Practices are designed as a reference tool for Member and non-member counNORAD Report No. 2001/1 (2001), available at http://www.norad.no/items/1128/38/257
4038865/0101coordination%20of%20budget%20support.pdf.
63. OECD Best Practices, supra note 1.
64. OECD, Fiscal Sustainability, supra note 27, at 117.
65. Joumard et al., supra note 22, at 117–18.
66. Id. at 127.
67. OECD Best Practices, supra note 1, at 122–23.
68. Joumard et al., supra note 22, at 130.
69. OECD Best Practices, supra note 1, at 7.
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tries to use in order to increase the degree of budget transparency in their
respective countries.”70
Since 2003, the OECD has also engaged in a major research endeavour
to collect detailed information about budget practices in member and
selected non-member countries, through a questionnaire which covers
many of the aspects of transparency addressed in OECD Best Practices.71
The findings of this research are made public as a free electronic database which has been used by academics to compare and rank the fiscal
transparency of different countries.72 While it is difficult to measure the
extent to which domestic policy makers, investment analysts, or other
players are influenced by these rankings, their existence suggests that the
OECD functions as another informal regulator of budgeting norms,
though it plays a less direct role than the IMF.
3. NGOs
The concept of “transparency” has a venerable history among NGOs,
particularly with respect to their work on corruption. Several nongovernmental actors are making efforts at the international level to encourage and assess budget transparency in different countries. Perhaps the
most prominent is the IBP of the Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities,
based in Washington, D.C. In a study on who uses the IMF Code, Petrie
reported that civil society organizations generally found it inadequate for
their purposes and thus have developed their own modified standards.73
For example, in the late 1990s, the IBP worked with the IDASA to formulate an alternative budget transparency questionnaire for use in South
Africa and several other African countries.74 The authors of the IBP report offered a rationale for the study: “in the context of widespread poverty in the developing world, citizens and civil society organizations are
70. Id.
71. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD BUDGET PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES SURVEY, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/45/39466141.pdf (the most
recent version of the survey). Interestingly, while the survey includes questions about any
substantive fiscal rules applicable in the jurisdiction (such as spending caps or balanced
budget rules), it does not ask whether a country has enacted fiscal transparency legislation. Id. at 14.
72. The database was most recently updated in 2007, and can be accessed at http://web
net4.oecd.org/budgeting/Budgeting.aspx. For rankings based on the database, see, for
example, JAMES E. ALT ET. AL., FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND FISCAL POLICY OUTCOMES IN
OECD COUNTRIES (2003); Francisco Bastida & Bernardino Benito, Central Government
Budget Practices and Transparency: An International Comparison, 85 PUB. ADMIN. 667,
680, 684–85 (2007).
73. Petrie, Promoting Fiscal Transparency, supra note 61, at 20.
74. FÖLSCHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 3.
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increasingly focusing on the budget and its effects on the distribution of
resources, leading them to demand more and better budget information.”75 Contrasting this explanation with the IMF and OECD emphasis
on fiscal discipline and credibility demonstrates the range of different
meanings and goals that can be attached to the concept of fiscal transparency. These different visions are also reflected in the specific criteria
used to measure transparency at the country level, the subject of Part III
below.
The IBP also helped to initiate a comparative study of budget transparency in five Latin American countries.76 The study was designed and
carried out by civil society groups and academics based in Latin America, and it employed both a survey of expert participants in the budget
process and a separate study of the legal framework for budgeting in
each country. This methodology was chosen in order to assess “whether
the lack of transparency is due to legal gaps or a deficient application of
budget legislation.”77 Since the release of these regional studies, in 2006
the IBP launched its more ambitious Open Budget Index (“IBP Index”),
which examines budgeting practices in a large number of countries
through a detailed questionnaire used by independent academic or civil
society researchers to assess performance in each country.78 The most
recent Open Budget Index, from 2008, surveyed eighty countries. In its
final report, the IBP asserts that eighty percent of these countries fail to
provide enough information to their citizens to ensure accountability,
while fifty percent of these countries provide such minimal information
that they can hide unpopular, wasteful, or corrupt spending.79
It would be a mistake to treat NGO work on fiscal transparency as entirely separate and distinct from that of the international financial institutions. Certainly, the NGO focus on empowering local civil society
75. Id. at 3.
76. See Index of Five Latin American Countries, supra note 3.
77. Id. at 1. The researchers found that while laws regulating the budget process existed in the region, they did not include mechanisms to promote citizen participation. Id.
78. Open Budget Initiative, Country Date Archives, http://www.openbudgetindex.org/
countryData/?fa=archive&pubdate=10/18/06 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). For this report
and many resources on budget transparency projects worldwide, see Internationall Budget Partnershipship, http://www.internationalbudget.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). The
survey results were unveiled on October 18, 2006. The concept of such an index clearly
takes inspiration from Transparency International’s work on measuring corruption
worldwide. See Transparency Internationall: The Global Coalition Against Corruption,
www.transparency.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
79. INT’L BUDGET P’SHIP, OPEN BUDGETS TRANSFORM LIVES: THE OPEN BUDGET
SURVEY 2008, at 3 (2008), available at http://openbudgetindex.org/files/FinalFullReport
English1.pdf [hereinafter OPEN BUDGET SURVEY 2008].
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groups to engage in the budget process means they are less preoccupied
than the IMF or OECD with issues of economic stability and growth.
However, the IBP does not present itself as opposing the IMF’s fiscal
transparency campaign, but rather supplementing it with research and
activism. The IBP is eager to point out that a consensus in favor of transparency crosses a range of interests:
[T]he idea of promoting open budgets is one that can gather support
from a wide range of actors, leading to a coalition not available on other
issues. Business interests often favor open budgets because they provide a better understood context in which to invest. International organizations support them because they feel open budgets are essential to
good governance. Civil society organizations favor open budgets reflecting their general support of more open and democratic societies.
Governments find them hard to oppose.80

Thus, the IBP and IDASA have lauded the IMF Code as “an important
advance in efforts to promote fiscal transparency,” while also asserting
that “it is limited, particularly when it is examined from the perspective
of promoting participation in the budget decision-making process.”81 The
IMF staff has participated in conferences of the IBP, and its Code has
served as a starting point for IBP work. On the other side, there is some
evidence that IMF personnel have begun to place some stock in the IBP’s
findings about transparency for particular countries and to incorporate
them into its analyses.82 This interweaving complicates the pattern of
norm development at the transnational level, as it suggests a significant
degree of collaboration among different policy networks or epistemic
communities.
4. Aid Donors
Budget transparency and accountability also concern governments and
institutions in their capacity as aid donors. As identified recently by the
OECD, donors and the World Bank have put significant effort into
strengthening and managing accountability for aid and project expenditure and much less into budgeting in general, or tax policy and administration in countries receiving aid.83 Several avenues have been developed
80. Transparency and Participation in the Budget Process, supra note 3.
81. FÖLSCHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 6 n.4.
82. See, e.g., Taryn Parry, The Role of Fiscal Transparency in Sustaining Growth and
Stability in Latin America 22 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/220, 2007)
(including data from the Open Budget Index).
83. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GOVERNANCE, TAXATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ISSUES AND PRACTICES 27 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/
35/40210055.pdf [hereinafter OECD, GOVERNANCE].
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by country donors to strengthen and help manage public finances and
fiscal policy in aid-recipient countries.
First, the process outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(“PRSP”) associated with conditional lending and debt relief comprises
the central means by which the IMF and World Bank seek to consult
with developing States, the poor, and other stakeholders with respect to
expenditures, reforms, and general policy. As of March 2009, more than
sixty-six countries have completed PRSPs since 2000.84 They are lengthy
documents, running to several hundred pages. As stated by the IMF, the
key goals of PRSPs are to “strengthen country ownership” and “enhance
the poverty focus” of reform programs and to “provide for stronger collaboration” among the institutions, recipient countries, and other development lenders and donors.85
Second, the OECD, jointly with the Development Assistance Committee (“DAC”), the peak body for donor countries, have begun to monitor
aid effectiveness, and in 2005 they established a program to monitor the
use of harmonized standards to assess public financial management in
aid-recipient countries; to provide training and share experiences; and to
establish harmonized accounting standards for aid-recipient countries
reporting on external assistance.86
This monitoring process builds on the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (“PEFA”) program established in 2001, and is jointly
financed by the European Commission, France, the IMF, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (through its Department for International
Development), and the World Bank (using its Development Grant Facility), , the United Kingdom (through its Department for International Development)87 PEFA’s goal is to strengthen both “recipient and donor
84. Int’l Monetary Fund, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.
imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp. Many countries have completed more than one PRSP.
Id.
85. Int’l Monetary Fund, Indep. Evaluation Office, Evaluation of the IMF’s Role in
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 14
(2004), available at http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2004/prspprgf/eng.index.htm.
86. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness:
Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability (Mar. 2,
2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf [hereinafter Paris
Declaration]. The Paris Declaration was an international agreement to which over one
hundred ministers, heads of agencies, and other senior officials adhered and committed
their countries and organizations in order to continue to increase efforts in harmonization,
alignment, and managing aid. This resulted in a set of actions and indicators capable of
being monitored.
87. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, About PEFA—PEFA Program,
http://www.pefa.org/about_pefamn.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
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ability” in order to assess the condition of (presumably recipient) country
public expenditure, and procurement and financial accountability systems, generally termed Public Financial Management (“PFM”), and to
develop reforms and capacity building in this area.88
The PEFA framework replaces the previous Highly Indebted Poor
Country framework for country financial assessment (so as to qualify
countries for debt relief under that program) and is being used by the
United Kingdom and some other States in their own donor assessments
of countries.89 PEFA claims strong support for its framework for assessing public financial management and suggests that the framework is likely
to be sustainable into the future because of several factors, among others:
(i) its wide support from international agencies (the members of the
OECD DAC joint venture on PFM), (ii) its fast, global adoption, despite the decentralized (country based) decision-making on if and when
to use the Framework, [and] (iii) the agreement to implement repeat assessments in many countries . . . .90

One concern that has been widely aired over the last decade about reforms implemented in donor and lender-dominated processes has been a
lack of country “ownership” of the reform. Ten years ago, this was described in relation to conditionality-linked loan facilities of the IMF as
follows:
The one common theme that runs through perceptions of [the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility] . . . is a feeling of a loss of control over
the policy content and the pace of implementation of reform . . . .
[T]here is broad agreement that ownership is a necessary condition of
successful policy reform.91

PEFA states that it aims for a significant level of “country ownership”
of expenditure management policy and systems in order to reduce transaction costs for aid recipient and donor countries, and to increase donor
harmonization (fragmentation of aid is described as a very significant
88. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, About PEFA—PEFA Goals,
http://www.pefa.org/about_pefamn.php (last visited Apr. 27, 2009).
89. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., BETTER AID: MANAGING DEVELOPMENT
RESOURCES—THE USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS IN PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 52–58
(2009).
90. Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.pefa.org/faqmn.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter PEFA FAQs].
91. INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPORT OF THE GROUP OF INDEPENDENT PERSONS
APPOINTED TO CONDUCT AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE ENHANCED STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FACILITY (PART 2), at 20 (1998) (prepared by Kwesi Botchwey, Paul
Collier, Jan Willem Gunning & Koichi Hamada), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/extev/esaf2.pdf.
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complicating factor for recipient-country budget processes). While separate from the fiscal transparency and budget assessment processes, with a
particular focus on expenditure and tracking of aid funds (and debt relief
benefits), the PEFA framework has developed largely on account of increased attention to country ownership and the move to include aid funds
in a government budget rather than off budget.92
Budget support requires donors to negotiate with a government about
the overall budget expenditure process and administration through governmental mechanisms, in contrast to direct aid-to-project processes,
which are administered and funded in communities by external agencies
or nongovernment organizations. Most aid is provided directly on a
project basis and hence is off budget. This presents real challenges for
countries seeking to enhance budget transparency and accountability and
also receiving large aid inflows, in particular, because these can be volatile and uncertain unless there is a mechanism for centrally tracking all
aid disbursements. The World Bank has begun to take the view that a
country’s budget process is “the central institutional framework for exercising choices on where resources should be channeled and for holding
governments accountable.”93 The European Commission and World
Bank aim to provide thirty percent of aid through long-term budget support.94
Concerns associated with budget support as the mechanism for aid
provision include fiduciary risk where financial management in a country
is weak (especially, the risk that aid will be misappropriated), increased
transaction costs for donors, and a strain on the capacity of the ministry
of finance as the main coordinator of a variety of development priorities.
However, the “emerging consensus among donors is that budget support
is an approach better suited to countries with a good track record and . . .
transparent budget management.”95
The PEFA framework overlaps with the IMF fiscal ROSC process and
with budget transparency norms. PEFA explains this as follows:

92. BUDGET SUPPORT AS MORE EFFECTIVE AID? RECENT EXPERIENCES AND EMERGING
LESSONS (Stefan Koeberle, Zoran Stavreski & Jan Walliser eds., 2006), available at
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/04/2
7/000090341_20060427100443/Rendered/PDF/359670Budget0Support01PUBLIC1.pdf.
93. Id. at 4.
94. See id. (providing a detailed discussion of recent experiences and issues).
95. Id. at 12. However, note that caution is required as the implementation of budget
support can cause some perverse outcomes. See Philippa Venning, Impact of Budget Support on Accountabilities at the Local Level in Indonesia, 1 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 105
(2009).
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The mobilization and utilization of financial resources for the public is
a most essential part of governance. Where transparency and accountability mechanisms are weak or lacking, poor people’s needs are often
marginalized and development outcomes suffer. Several PFM analytical tools can help to promote transparency through publication of their
findings, including in a PFM Performance Report. However, monitoring is key to accountability . . . . The PEFA Framework can therefore
provide an important part of a monitoring framework for governance.96

B. Country Initiatives
In this Section we shift the focus to the domestic level by charting the
adoption of budget-related legislation in selected countries, seeking to
uncover the historical process of norm creation and transfer.
1. Developed Countries: New Zealand, Australia, and
the United Kingdom
The experience of these three countries is critical because it shows that
ideas about fiscal transparency have migrated not only from the transnational to the domestic level, but also in the reverse direction. All three
countries were ranked above average in a recent study of country compliance with OECD Best Practices, with New Zealand ranked “far and
away” the best performing country.97 As we shall see, this may be because the OECD Best Practices follow the New Zealand design. According to this study, Australia ranks high on integrity, control, and accountability, but less high on budget reports and specific disclosures, while
the United Kingdom ranks high on disclosures and accountability, but
very low on budget reports (a mark which brings its average down).98
Both the United Kingdom and New Zealand also rank very high in the
IBP Open Budget Survey 2008 (as does the United States); ironically,
Australia is not included in that Index.99
As with monetary policy, New Zealand pioneered the design of budget
transparency legislation with its Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994,100 a
move that predated all of the international fiscal transparency codes. This

96. PEFA FAQs, supra note 90 (follow hyperlink to question 1.2).
97. Bastida & Benito, supra note 72, at 680, 684–85. We consider the results of this
study (one of the few comparative studies made to date) to be interesting, but to have
significant limitations, including that it is based on country self-reporting through the
OECD questionnaire process; and that it does not examine actual practice but the legal
and administrative procedures in place.
98. Id. at 684–85.
99. OPEN BUDGET SURVEY 2008, supra note 79, at 7.
100. Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, 1994 S.N.Z. No. 18 (N.Z.).
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Act was highly innovative in that it sought to tighten fiscal discipline not
through hard fiscal caps, but through procedural rules that stressed transparency.101 It caught the attention of fiscal policy analysts in the international agencies, and the New Zealand model quickly became a “benchmark” for defining fiscal transparency.102
Australia and the United Kingdom followed suit by enacting comparable statutes in 1998, the same year the IMF approved its first version of
the Code.103 All three governments eschewed strict numerical limits in
favor of procedural rules that mandated disclosure of the government’s
fiscal policy agenda and actual results on an ongoing basis. The experience of these nations influenced the development and enforcement of
fiscal transparency standards set by the IMF and OECD.
For example, Australia took an early leadership role by conducting a
detailed analysis of its own compliance with the IMF Code shortly after
its adoption in 1998. IMF staff participated as independent reviewers of
the draft report. The stated purpose of the whole exercise was to “contribute to international financial reform” by “preparing a self-assessment
report, providing a format and methodology that other countries may
choose to follow.”104 Australia’s Charter of Budget Honesty emphasizes
the publication of fiscal strategies, outlook and performance reports, and
a long-term intergenerational report.105 Australia is said to have pioneered the medium term expenditure framework (“MTEF”) using multiyear forward estimates as the starting point for considering governmental
department bids for resources from the budget within the overall resource
framework set by the government.106 This requirement is not contained in
detail in the Charter, although it does require fiscal objectives and forecasting on a rolling three-year time horizon—in substance, an MTEF.
101. See Angela Barnes & Steve Leith, Budget Management That Counts: Recent Approaches to Budget and Fiscal Management in New Zealand 2 (N.Z. Treasury Dep’t,
Treasury Working Paper No. 01/24, 2001); Jon Janssen, New Zealand’s Fiscal Policy
Framework: Experience and Evolution 2 (N.Z. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury Working Paper
No. 01/25, 2001). See also GRAHAM C. SCOTT, GOVERNMENT REFORM IN NEW ZEALAND
(1996); Marco Cangiano, Accountability and Transparency in the Public Sector: The
New Zealand Experience (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 96/122, 1996).
102. See Kopits & Craig, supra note 27, at 37. The New Zealand legislation was highlighted as a novel approach in OECD, Budgeting for the Future 19–23 (OECD, Working Paper No. 95, 1997).
103. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998, c. 22 (Austl.); Code for Fiscal Stability,
1998, c. 36, § 155 (Eng.).
104. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., MAKING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT: AN AUSTRALIAN ASSESSMENT at vi (1999), available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/178/
PDF/intro.pdf.
105. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998.
106. Schick, supra note 11, at 18.
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Overall, the budget is to be managed in accordance with “prudent” fiscal
practice.107
The United Kingdom’s Code for Fiscal Stability (“U.K. Code”) was
approved by the Parliament under Section 155(7) of the Finance Act
1998.108 New Zealand’s example and the IMF work on budget transparency both appear to have been important influences. However, perhaps
most important was the goal of “signaling a commitment to sensible
management of the public finances” by the new Labor government.109
Chancellor Gordon Brown stated that the U.K. Code was intended to
strengthen the openness, transparency, and “credibility” of fiscal policy.110 The U.K. Code does not impose explicit fiscal caps, but operates
together with two nonbinding, “conventional” budget principles outside
the U.K. Code.111 These principles are the “golden rule,” which states
that the current budget surplus must be at least zero, or rather, there
should not be a deficit over an economic cycle, and the “sustainable investment” rule, which requires the net debt to be maintained below forty
percent of GDP in an economic cycle.
The role of New Zealand especially suggests that fiscal transparency
norms did not simply emerge from within the IMF, but were formed by a
broader epistemic community that included policy makers from certain
key developed countries. However, once a blueprint was codified at the
international level, the IMF and OECD began using it to assess the budget institutions and practices of many other countries facing a wide range
of different economic challenges. As Rodrik observes, the use of such
blueprints may be beneficial in enabling an efficient process of reform,
but also carries risks if it overshadows local political processes that ensure local ownership, and effective design and implementation of re107. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998, § 5.
108. The EU Stability and Growth Pact was also being developed at this time. See
Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997 O.J. (C 236).
Although the United Kingdom did not join the euro currency area (and hence is not required to adhere to the strict budgetary deficit rules established under the Maastricht
Treaty), as a member of the EU, it monitors its compliance with the European Pact. European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs—United Kingdom, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/eu_economic_situation/member_state8622_en.htm (last visited Apr. 19,
2009).
109. See Emmerson, Frayne & Love, supra note 10, at 6. The Labour Party under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown was elected in a landslide victory in 1997. Blair’s Britain—
Blair’s Team Tackles Britain, BBCNEWS.COM, Dec. 26, 1997, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
special_report/for_christmas/_new_year/blairs_britain/39177.stm.
110. Code for Fiscal Stability, 1998, c. 36, § 155 (Eng.); Her Majesty’s Treasury,
Chancellor Proposes Code for Fiscal Stability (Nov. 25, 1997), http://www.hm-treasury.
gov.uk/prebud_pbr97_presshmt2.htm.
111. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53.
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forms.112 In particular, according to Stevens, attempts to reform the public financial management systems of developing countries by simply
transplanting advanced-country best practices have often failed. Too often, such reforms do not jibe with the informal culture and traditions that
have helped to stabilize the host State, or they require too much support
from external consultants to be sustained over the long-term.113
2. Developing and Emerging Countries: Nigeria, Pakistan,
India, and South Africa
During the last decade, developing and emerging countries have also
begun moving towards establishing or reforming budget laws and fiscal
frameworks. In adopting these laws, some countries were influenced by
the policy directions of the IMF, either through conditionality-linked borrowing or as part of the general surveillance process carried out by the
IMF, including a fiscal ROSC. In other countries, in particular emerging
economies and strong democracies like South Africa and India, a different path has been taken towards establishing fiscal transparency laws,
with some different outcomes in both the content and impact of these
laws.
(a) Pakistan and Nigeria: IMF-Linked Reforms
In 2000, the IMF lamented in a review of Pakistan’s fiscal regime that
“[t]he current legal framework does not make specific provision for reporting on performance or reporting to parliament or the public beyond
the annual budget and annual accounts presentations.”114 It recommended
that Pakistan consider “developing a Public Finance Act . . . giving explicit emphasis to performance and fiscal transparency.”115 Three years
later, following a technical advice mission to Pakistan, the IMF reported
that the country had made progress on transparency through several
steps, including “preparation of a draft fiscal responsibility law.”116 Pa112. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS,
(2007), at 164–65.
113. Stevens, supra note 9, at 1–4.
114. INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, REPORT ON OBSERVANCE OF
STANDARDS AND CODES: PAKISTAN—FISCAL TRANSPARENCY, ¶ 13, (Nov. 28, 2000),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/pak/fiscal.htm.
115. Id. ¶ 38.
116. REPORT ON PROGRESS, supra note 55, at 13. Additionally, there are other reports
urging or praising the adoption of fiscal transparency legislation at the country level. See,
e.g., Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, United States: Report on the Observance
of Standards and Codes—Fiscal Transparency, ¶ 1, IMF Country Report No. 03/243
(Aug. 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03243.pdf.
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
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kistan’s Parliament subsequently enacted the Fiscal Responsibility and
Debt Limitation Act 2005, which includes both substantive fiscal targets
and transparency provisions requiring the government to make regular
reports to the National Assembly.117 While domestic politics undoubtedly
also played a role in bringing about this law reform, the IMF’s involvement through its fiscal ROSC process is clearly evident. In this sense,
Pakistan’s legislation can be viewed as a hard law manifestation of soft
law promulgated at the transnational level.
There is no published IMF fiscal ROSC available for Nigeria. Transparency and corruption have been and remain enormous problems in this
country, particularly in relation to oil extraction. Although Nigeria has
managed to pay down its international creditors and does not borrow
from the IMF, domestic tensions about oil projects remain high. However, in the last few years, there have been some developments relating to
transparency, including the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007.118 First introduced in 2004 by Finance Minister Ngolzi Okonjo-Iweala, this Act
imposes only soft limits on deficits and debt.119 Its main focus is to
improve transparency, for example, by requiring the government to set
explicit fiscal targets over a three-year time horizon, and then to file
quarterly reports on its own performance in reaching these objectives.120
Although Nigeria is not publicly engaged with the IMF, its massive oil
wealth has finally led to significant attention to the transparency of resource revenues. The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative report, prepared by an international auditor, was published in April
2006,121 and Nigeria entered into a policy support instrument with the
IMF in October 2005 (which ended in 2007, around the same time that
the Fiscal Responsibility Bill received approval in the National Assem117. Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, Gazette of Pakistan, No. VI, June
13, 2005, at 115.
118. Nigeria: Yar’Adua Signs Fiscal Responsibility Bill into Law, THIS DAY, Nov. 8,
2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200711090303.html.
119. Fiscal Responsibility Act, § 12(1) (restricting annual deficits to no more than
three percent of gross domestic product “or any sustainable percentage as may be determined by the National Assembly for each financial year”); id. § 41(1)(c) (requiring the
government to ensure that public debt “is held at a sustainable level as prescribed from
time to time by the National Assembly on the advice of the Minister”).
120. Id. pt. II (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework); id. § 30.
121. This report follows the IMF Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a
process also complemented by Transparency International’s recently established civil
society/NGO project. Transparency Int’l, Promoting Revenue Transparency Project:
Project Description and Relationship with EITI, http://www.transparency.org/policy_
research/surveys_indices/promoting_revenue_transparency/in_english/eiti (click “English” for PDF) (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
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bly). The policy support instrument is described by the IMF as a purely
voluntary process in which a member country signs up for “more frequent Fund assessments” of its economic and financial policies.122 It
promotes a “close policy dialogue” between the IMF and the country,
with the primary goal of “deliver[ing] clear signals on the strength of
these policies.”123 The IMF explains:
“Signaling” refers to the information that Fund activities can indirectly
provide about countries’ performances and prospects. Such information
can be used to inform the decisions of outsiders. Outsiders can include
private creditors, including banks and bondholders, who are interested
in information on the repayment prospects of loans; official donors and
creditors, both bilateral and multilateral, who may be interested in reassurance about the countries they are supporting; and the public at
large.124

In its concluding review of the policy support instrument with Nigeria,
the IMF highlighted the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill as one
of the structural reforms contributing to improved economic governance
in the country.125 Nigeria’s engagement with the IMF suggests that its
transparency initiatives are largely directed at outside investors, creditors, and donors. Even so, the Nigerian Fiscal Responsibility Bill has
been praised by Human Rights Watch126 and the Nigerian Budget Monitoring Group.127 While the new law may represent an important symbolic
victory for those advocating fiscal governance reforms within the country, it remains to be seen whether this will translate into greater fiscal
openness and integrity.

122. Int’l Monetary Fund, Factsheet—The Policy Support Instrument, Nov. 2008,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Int’l Monetary Fund, Nigeria: Fourth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument—Staff Report 29, IMF Country Report No. 07/353 7 (2007), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=21414.0.
126. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHOP FINE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA 94–98
(2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0107%5B1%5D.pdf.
127. Nigeria Budget Monitoring Project, Fiscal Responsibility Bill: Rising Hopes in
the Horizon, Feb. 26, 2007, http://www.budgetmonitoringng.org/Spotlights/2007/02/26/
News11618/ [hereinafter Rising Hopes]; Vincent Nwanma, Fiscal Responsibility: Don’t
Spend Money Unless You Have It, NIG. BUDGET MONITORING PROJECT, http://www.
budgetmonitoringng.org/Spotlights/2007/12/13/News12271/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
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(b) India and South Africa: Activism and NGOs Driving Reform
India, which does not borrow from the IMF, is an example of a more
homegrown fiscal transparency reform process. In 2003, the Indian federal Parliament passed the Fiscal Reform and Budget Management
Act.128 This Act provides a substantive medium-term three-year fiscal
target and imposes on the central government reporting requirements for
strategies and outcomes.129 Section 6 states that the central government
“shall take suitable measures to ensure greater transparency in its fiscal
operations in the public interest and minimize secrecy.”130 According to
the IBP, the push for greater budget openness in India started with grass
roots civil society organizations tracking misuse of funds by local governments.131 Yet here, too, the IMF promoted reform of budget practices.
In its 2001 fiscal ROSC on India, the IMF commented that the country
had “achieved a reasonably high level of fiscal transparency,” but that
“[e]nacting the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill would
be a major step forward given the emphasis it places on achieving a high
standard of fiscal transparency.”132
According to one recent study, South Africa ranks above average, and
indeed, above the United Kingdom, in its compliance with OECD Best
Practices on fiscal transparency.133 In particular, South Africa has a high
ranking with respect to integrity, control, and accountability and a reasonable ranking for budget reports and disclosures.134 South Africa has a
substantial and informative budget website for its National Treasury, including guides to the national budget in Afrikaans, English, Tswana,
Xhosa, and Zulu.135 The website also sets out the core goals of the Treasury:
128. Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, No. 39 of 2003, Gazette of
India (2003).
129. Id. § 3.
130. Id. § 6.
131. See International Budget Partnership, Access to Budget Information Empowers
Citizens in India, http://openbudgetindex.org/files/IndiaStoryEnglish.pdf (last visited
Apr. 8, 2009). India has an active NGO sector in this area. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr.
for Budget & Governance Accountability, Civil Society People’s Charter on Union
Budget 2008–09: People’s Budget Initiative (Nov. 16, 2007), available at http://www.
cbgaindia.org/press_releases.php?id=7.
132. Int’l Monetary Fund, Statistics Dep’t, India: Report on the Observance of Standards
and Codes, ¶ 29, IMF Country Report No. 04/96 (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/rosc/ind/fiscal.htm.
133. Bastida & Benito, supra note 72, at 680.
134. Id.
135. See National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, www.treasury.gov.za (last visited May 8, 2009).
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Supporting efficient and sustainable public financial management is
fundamental to the promotion of economic development, good governance, social progress and a rising standard of living for all South
Africans. The Constitution of the Republic (Chapter 13) mandates the
National Treasury to ensure transparency, accountability and sound financial controls in the management of public finances.
. . . Over the current medium-term expenditure framework period
(2007–2009) the National Treasury will focus on sustaining growth and
macroeconomic stability, while accelerating development and the creation of employment opportunities.136

The high level of fiscal transparency in South Africa seems to have
been largely a response to NGO or civil society action during the late
1990s (after establishment of the new State in 1994). The Budget Information Service of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the
IBP produced a report on transparency and participation in South Africa’s budget process, which was released in October 1999, and revised in
2000.137 Around the same time, South Africa followed Australia’s example and successfully introduced a medium-term expenditure framework
that remains part of its budgetary process today.138 We suggest that the
reasons for the relatively successful implementation of this constraint
include its connection with the local activist push for fiscal transparency.139 South Africa’s engagement in the IMF fiscal ROSC process in
2001 was not the key influence on South African reform. South Africa
now appears to have satisfied the IMF on its transparency score—such
that the IMF’s most recent country report, from 2007, does not once
mention transparency as an issue or goal for South Africa.140
136. National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, The Role of the National Treasury,
http://www.finance.gov.za/nt/info.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
137. FÖLSCHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 3. The South African report is said to have
influenced research in other countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America. Id.
at 4.
138. See Foreword, in NAT’L TREASURY DEP’T, REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., MEDIUM TERM
BUDGET POLICY STATEMENT (1997), available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/
mtbps/1997/all.pdf. See also NAT’L TREASURY DEP’T, REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., MEDIUM
TERM BUDGET POLICY STATEMENT AND ADJUSTED ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURE
(2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2008/mtbps/MTBPS%
20full.pdf.
139. Matthew Andrews, Creating Space for Effective Political Engagement in Development, in GOVERNANCE REFORM UNDER REAL-WORLD CONDITIONS: CITIZENS, STAKEHOLDERS, AND VOICE 95 (Sina Odugbemi & Thomas Jacobson eds., 2008).
140. Int’l Monetary Fund, South Africa: 2007 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country
Report No. 07/274 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/
cr07274.pdf.
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III. THE CONTENT OF FISCAL TRANSPARENCY NORMS
Fiscal transparency is generally discussed as a neutral procedural norm
that will produce better or more predictable fiscal policy. We argue that
transparency standards have more normative content than their usual
treatment suggests and may serve different constituencies and substantive policy ends depending on the types of disclosure and processes they
require. Analysis of the IMF Code reveals a much larger “wish list” of
desirable practices for governance, subsumed under the overall banner of
fiscal transparency. While we will not set out exhaustively all of the elements of fiscal transparency as proposed by the various international
codes and national laws and policies, it is useful to survey and discuss
key elements of the IMF Code as the dominant model, as well as selected
features of the OECD Best Practices.
A. Rule of Law and Structure of Government
The first section of the IMF Code (and accompanying Manual) emphasizes the “[r]oles and [r]esponsibilities” of government, in particular, establishing clear, public rules about the structure and fiscal powers and
responsibilities of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government; setting out the relationship between government and public
corporations; and overseeing the relationship between government and
private enterprise with respect to the public availability of contractual
arrangements.141 In addition, the Code requires governments to publish
comprehensive, understandable budget, tax, and other public finance
laws; set forth regulations and administrative procedures relating to the
collection, commitment, and use of public funds; and provide the ability
to appeal tax and nontax obligations, and an explicitly legal basis for the
management of government assets and liabilities.142
The IMF appears, in this first section of the Code, to require member
countries to establish a solid constitutional framework for government,
together with property and contract rights, in a way that is recognizably
“Western” in form. The Code steers clear of requiring “democracy,” but
it assumes a legislature and the separation of powers, including a legal
basis for the power to tax; a legal basis for resource distribution and
public-private contracting; a working judiciary and appeals system; and a
clear legal definition of public property and public debt. The requirement
for clear rules on taxation implicitly assumes private property (i.e., there
must be something to tax). Thus, the “legal institutions” of property and
contract are embedded in this part of the Code, and the necessity for a
141. 2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, § 1.
142. Id. § 1.2.
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clear demarcation of public and private realms inscribes the market into
the very structure of the State.
This first section also makes clear that the IMF places considerable
emphasis on the role of national laws in securing fiscal transparency. The
Code states generally that “[t]he collection, commitment, and use of public funds should be governed by comprehensive budget, tax, and other
public finance laws, regulations[,] and administrative procedures.”143 The
Manual more clearly endorses the concept of fiscal transparency legislation or other legislated fiscal limits:
These arrangements generally support fiscal transparency by providing
a clear statement as to policy objectives and how these objectives will
be achieved, including informing the public of fiscal risks. One function of these laws is to help build support for fiscal consolidation by
strengthening the credibility of fiscal policies and by increasing accountability.144

Thus, the IMF evidences considerable faith in law as delivering the “governance” limb of development and in its use for the formalization of
essentially political and economic processes.
A study by Isabelle Joumard and others for the OECD noted that some
countries have legislated fiscal rules while others have merely adopted
policies or guidelines.145 The authors appear less persuaded than the IMF
about the value of law reform per se in the absence of political will, observing that “enforcing fiscal frameworks is a political economy issue as
well as a technical one.”146 Nonetheless, they identify how many countries have implemented fiscal transparency laws as a mechanism for improving fiscal discipline and policy outcomes, as seen in Part II.
B. Budget Process and Fiscal Objectives
The second key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for “open
budget processes” that “follow an established timetable” and are “guided
by well-defined macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives.”147 In particular, the Code requires
•

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

adequate time for a draft budget to be considered by the legislature;

2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, § 1.2.1.
2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 52.
Joumard et. al, supra note 22, at 120.
Id. at 130.
2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, § 2.1.

2009]

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY

•

a “realistic” budget presented in a medium-term framework and an
assessment of “fiscal sustainability” setting out the main assumptions and sensitivity analysis (for estimated errors);

•

a clear statement of any fiscal targets or rules;

•

a description of major expenditure and revenue measures lined to
policy objectives and with estimates of impact on the budget and
the economy;

•

clear mechanisms for coordination of budget and off-budget activities; and

•

an effective accounting system for monitoring and tracking revenues, commitments, liabilities, and assets, including a timely midyear report and account auditing presented to the legislature and
published within a year of the budget.148
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These requirements for open and timely budget information are clearly
essential for a legislature and for citizens to participate adequately in the
budget process. Similarly, effective accounting of revenues and the setting out and costing of expenditure goals are crucial. Both of these elements support democratic participation in budgeting as well as donor or
lender review of a government’s fiscal position.
The concept of a “realistic” budget appears to relate primarily to the
economic assumptions in the budget and assumptions about revenue projections and “targets” set out in multi-year development plans.149 Revenue forecasting150 is notoriously difficult even for developed countries,
except for the rule of thumb that a good starting point for predicting revenues in a given year is the revenues achieved in the prior year. Treasuries of developed countries, including that of the United Kingdom, have
been criticized for under-estimating tax revenues, in particular corporate
tax revenues.151 Developing countries may be too optimistic about revenue estimates, in particular where they are striving to increase “tax effort.” Both of these tendencies may be based on politics as well as statistics.
Both the IMF and the OECD emphasize that the creation of formal
procedures takes a substantial period of time. In addition to preparing the
advance provision of draft budgets and policies (several months before
the year commences), a government must plan a medium-term framework beyond the fiscal year and manage “sustainably” over the long148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. pt. II.
2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 37–38.
Id. at 49.
See, e.g., Emmerson, Frayne & Love, supra note 10.
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term—usually a time well beyond a normal democratic electoral cycle.152
In particular, the MTEF (or the similar notion of a medium-term budget
framework) has been most often proposed as an external “blueprint” for
reform, and the IMF contends that it is essential for fiscal transparency.153
However, even the IMF acknowledges how difficult establishing a
plausible and sustained MTEF can be. The IMF Manual points to successful implementation in Australia, Brazil, Chile, and the United Kingdom.
Nonetheless, the IMF underlines the necessity for “stringent conditions”;
“robust revenue forecasts”; “rigorous” connections between target expenditures and the expected economic prospects over time; and “clearly
defined and fully costed policy proposals.” It emphasizes that a mediumterm framework is “most likely to be effective in the context of a real,
stable, transparent, and well-publicized commitment to fiscal control.”154
These conditions are very challenging for developing countries with poor
systems, under-staffing, and low government commitment.155
It is also interesting to note the mechanisms for coordinating “onbudget” and “off-budget” items. Clearly, if we see the budget as a central
element of democratic governance, expenditures should be largely “onbudget.” However, it is often the case that various items are “off-budget,”
such as pension entitlements and special purpose funds. Furthermore, as
discussed above, most aid for developing countries is currently delivered
off-budget. It is laudable that the IMF calls for “a strong interface between the government’s national planning or development framework
(e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and the medium-term budget.”156
If aid flows are also accounted for in this overall framework, it may improve management and coordination of aid and other revenues and
spending. However, on the whole, the IMF Code as it is currently drafted
cannot address the issue of accountability of aid flows; these issues are
outside the scope of its fiscal transparency framework.
C. Public Budget Documentation
The third key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for timely
publication of all budget documentation, especially of fiscal information.

152. 2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, § 2.1.2; 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 78.
153. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 40–41.
154. Id.
155. A very recent IMF working paper acknowledges this and other difficulties in
budget reform. Richard Allen, The Challenge of Reforming Budgetary Institutions in
Developing Countries (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.09/96, 2009).
156. Id. at 39.

2009]

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY

833

Again, this is to be a “legal obligation” upon a government. In particular,
the IMF looks for the following:
•

the release of information in advance and the publication of outcomes for at least the two preceding years and forecasts for at least
the two following years;

•

tax expenditure statements and explanation of quasi-fiscal activity
and other fiscal risks;

•

reporting fiscal data on a gross basis, including separate identification of receipts from all revenue sources such as taxes, resourcerelated activities, foreign aid, information about expenditures and
debt, other significant liabilities (e.g., pensions), and natural resource assets;

•

reporting subnational government budgets and public corporation
positions;

•

a periodic report on long-term public finances;

•

wide distribution of a “clear and simple summary guide” at the
time of the annual budget;

•

reporting overall balance (fiscal deficit or surplus) and gross debt
of government for the period; and

•

reporting on an annual basis results linked to objectives of major
budget programs.157

Few would disagree that publicizing such information benefits a wide
range of social interests. Indeed, the IBP argues that many governments
could significantly improve fiscal transparency simply by making available to the public the budget information they already collect for donors or
for internal government purposes.158 However, some controversy surrounds the requirement to report on long-term finances, because of the
virtual impossibility of making accurate cost or revenue predictions over
a long horizon, which creates a risk that such reports will do more to
mislead than to inform. Neil Buchanan, for instance, has argued that
long-term forecasting, also known as “generational” accounting, tends to
raise false fears that social programs are unaffordable over the long-term
or will be excessively burdensome to future generations.159 To this we
would add that requiring such a report goes beyond simple disclosure. It
also directs fiscal policy makers to gather, analyze, and consider particu157. 2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, pt. III.
158. OPEN BUDGET SURVEY 2008, supra note 79.
159. See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice and Long-Term
Deficits, 58 TAX L. REV. 275, 312 (2005).
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lar kinds of information focused on the longer term, and tends to overemphasize the values of fiscal prudence and discipline. These values are
further reinforced by the need to disclose aggregate budget balance and
debt. In contrast, it is striking that neither the IMF Code nor the OECD
Best Practices call for disclosure of any specific information about the
distributive impact of the annual budget or fiscal policy for the current
population. The content of tax expenditure reports, for example, is either
left to governments to determine or weighted toward the types of information that will expose any risk of fiscal imbalance.
D. Integrity of Data and Bureaucracy
The fourth element of the IMF Code encompasses a number of different strands that concern the integrity of data and bureaucracy. The IMF
calls for measures to secure the quality of fiscal data.160 These include
forecasts, indication of the cash or accrual accounting basis, and the application of “generally accepted accounting standards” for the public sector in a manner that is internally consistent and reconciled with other data
sources.161 The Code also proposes internal and external auditing of government activities and finances. These data and accounting criteria draw
heavily on the establishment and dissemination of global accounting
standards for both public and private bodies—integrating the “fiscal
transparency” norm-development process into a wider network.
The IMF also calls for clear ethical standards for public servants and
publication of their conditions of employment. And concerning procurement, it demands purchase and sale of public assets and major transactions; independence of the revenue authority from political direction;
protection of taxpayer rights; and regular reporting to the public by the
revenue authority.162 Here, the IMF Code overlaps with the very considerable work that international institutions responding to corruption have
undertaken in the last decade.
The reference to an independent revenue authority has a long history in
the IMF and its reform recommendations for developing countries. The
OECD has recently noted that the establishment of autonomous revenue
authorities has been a “high-profile innovation, and a particular focus for
donor support,” and about thirty such authorities have now been established in developing countries, mostly in Africa and South America.163
However, as the OECD has also observed, experience in successfully
160.
161.
162.
163.

2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
OECD, GOVERNANCE, supra note 83, at 28.
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establishing an “autonomous” agency independent of political interference has been mixed and “early gains have been hard to sustain.”164 As
“tax collection cannot be entirely divorced from making tax and budget
policy,” reporting lines to the executive government must be carefully
established.165
Even more recently, a new emphasis on taxpayer rights, as opposed to
merely strengthening the revenue authority, is welcome, as this can help
establish a sounder political basis for participation in taxing and spending.166 This seems to be one way in which the IMF has (indirectly) acknowledged the need for active engagement and protection of taxpayers,
albeit it proposes this in the quite limited context of engagement with the
revenue authority, rather than the budget process more broadly.
In this Part, we have reviewed the main features of the IMF model and
have pointed out that it does far more to promote values of fiscal prudence, discipline, and integrity than to support other possible goals of
transparency, such as equity or democratic oversight. No one could seriously protest that prudence, discipline, and integrity are unimportant—
they are clearly imperative to all citizens, including those concerned with
improving the fairness and democratic oversight of budgets. This is reflected in the fact that independent watchdogs such as the IBP and
IDASA have incorporated many of the IMF’s budget transparency requirements. However, as discussed in the next Part, these groups have
supplemented the IMF standards with their own criteria related to social
equality and democracy.
IV. FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distributive politics are at the heart of fiscal policy because they will
often make or break the viability of a reform. For this pragmatic reason,
if no other, the omission of distributive analysis from the dominant model of fiscal transparency is problematic. We also consider it to be troublesome, though, for the establishment of fairness in principle.
As already noted, there is no requirement in the IMF Code or OECD
Best Practices for governments to report on how fiscal policy decisions
impact different income groups or segments of the population. However,
in the most recent version of the Manual that accompanies the IMF

164. Id. South Africa, as in so many other ways, is an exception.
165. Id.
166. Florens Luoga, Taxpayers Rights in the Context of Democratic Governance: Tanzania, 33 INST. OF DEV. STUD. BULL. 50 (2002).

836

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:3

Code, the IMF does briefly acknowledge that fiscal discipline may involve political tradeoffs that ideally should be disclosed:
Reforms aimed at reducing fiscal deficits and improving macro stability, or at enhancing efficiency, may affect different income and social
groups differently, and may hurt or benefit vulnerable and low-income
groups more than others. It is important for transparency that some assessment of these impacts be included in the budget documentation . . . .
Poverty and Social Impact Analysis refers to the analysis of the distributional impact of policies and policy reforms on the welfare of different groups, with a specific emphasis on the poor and vulnerable . . . .
Good practice would require that budget documentation include at least
a simple analysis of the differential impacts of new policies and measures.167

The addition of this commentary may reflect the IMF’s sensitivity to
criticisms of its structural adjustment programs and the need to acknowledge the turn in development discourse often found in its own policy advice. However, it is important to note that the Manual is 124 pages long
(plus glossary and references), and these passages only briefly interrupt
an otherwise unrelenting focus on fiscal discipline and integrity.168 Nor
do they impose more than a minimal obligation to include some basic
analysis of distributional impact. Most importantly, these recommendations are not reflected in the Code itself. The reason may have to do with
concerns that this type of information will increase the likelihood of political resistance to tough decisions about spending restraint or taxation,
challenging the ability of governments to deliver on their promises of
fiscal prudence. As Heald discusses, one view is that “‘too much’ transparency produces ‘over-exposure,’ leading to losses in effectiveness
through high levels of transaction costs and excessive politicization.”169
Unsurprisingly, NGOs involved with budget transparency have placed
social equity issues higher on the agenda. In developing the IBP Index,
the IBP states that IMF standards “do not go far enough to ensure that
budgeting is responsive and accountable to citizens.”170 To redress this,
167. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 44. The Manual goes on to briefly describe
various methods that can be used to carry out a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis. Id. at
45.
168. See generally id.
169. David Heald, Fiscal Transparency: Concepts, Measurement and U.K. Practice,
81 PUB. ADMIN. 723, 727 (2003). Similarly, Tanzi argues that “[t]rying to eliminate corruption altogether would be too costly, both in terms of resources and in other ways.”
Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World, 45 INT’L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 559,
586 (1998).
170. IBP INDEX, supra note 3, at 3.
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the IBP’s survey questionnaire includes the following questions, to be
answered on a transparency scale of one to five:
55. Does the executive’s budget or any supporting budget documentation present information on policies (both proposals and existing commitments) in at least the budget year that are intended to benefit directly the country’s most impoverished populations? . . .
....
57. Does the executive make available to the public an analysis of the
distribution of the tax burden? . . .
....
65. Are citizens able in practice to obtain non-financial information related to expenditures (for example, number of beneficiaries, number of
persons employed by the program, etc.) for individual programs in a
format that is more highly disaggregated than that which appears in the
executive’s budget proposal if they request it from a ministry or agency? . . .
....
109. Does the year-end report explain the difference between the
enacted level of funds intended to benefit directly the country’s most
impoverished populations and the actual outcome? . . .171

In addition, the IBP asks numerous questions about availability of information to citizens and recommends that the right to obtain not only
budget documents but also detailed information about particular program
expenditures at the local level be established by legislation.172
An earlier 2001 study of budget transparency in Latin American countries also highlighted the connection of transparency to social equity,
stating that “knowledge and analysis of the budget should be sufficient to
make it possible for the external observers to verify whether the distribution of . . . resources and their application reflect social preferences and
comply with the criteria of equality and justice.”173 Notably, however,
this survey instrument did not include direct questions about the availability of distributive information related to budget policies. Instead, these
171. INT’L BUDGET P’SHIP, OPEN BUDGET QUESTIONNAIRE: NEW ZEALAND (Sept. 28,
2007), available at http://openbudgetindex.org/files/IBPQuestionnaire2008NewZealand.pdf.
The survey questionnaires with country responses are available online at http://www.open
budgetindex.org/countryData/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
172. See, e.g., INT’L BUDGET P’SHIP, KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2008),
available at http://openbudgetindex.org/files/KeyFindingsEnglish.pdf.
173. Index of Five Latin American Countries, supra note 3, at 12. This study was facilitated in part by the IBP, but conducted independently by the Latin American partners.
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issues were addressed indirectly through numerous questions about citizen access to and influence over the budget process.174 This approach has
remained consistent in two follow-up studies, the most recent of which
adopts a more politically neutral definition of transparency, but also
states that “[a]pplied budget analysis . . . makes it possible to evaluate
who wins and who loses with the distribution of public resources.”175
In South Africa, the collaborative 1999 study by the IBP and IDASA
concluded, among its many findings, that “analysis of tax incidence is
lacking”176 in South Africa’s budget documentation. The report recommended that detailed information on spending allocations be provided to
Parliament earlier in the budget process and cited the lack of consistent
and detailed data as a barrier to oversight of budgets by civil society.177 It
also described the limited but growing role of civil society groups in
meeting with parliamentary committees to discuss issues such as the
priorities of low-income people and women, as well as sectionalized social welfare.178
Like the IMF and OECD, these NGOs have attempted to articulate
global standards of fiscal transparency that can be applied to evaluate
country practice and create pressure for reform. The NGOs have taken
some modest steps to add a distributive lens to the assessment of fiscal
transparency, while also confirming the importance of reliable information regarding the government’s fiscal prudence and integrity. It must be
acknowledged that analysis of distributional incidence of taxes and
spending may be difficult, especially for countries with a low analytical
capacity in government.179 However, such difficulties also arise with revenue estimating, forecasting, and the establishment of credible medium-

174. See generally id.
175. CENTRO DE ANÁLISIS E INVESTIGACIÓN, LATIN AMERICAN INDEX OF BUDGET TRANSPARENCY 2005: A COMPARISON OF 8 COUNTRIES, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.fun
dar.org.mx/indice2005/docs/Regional%20Transparency%20Report%202005.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET TRANSPARENCY 2005]; LATIN AMERICAN INDEX OF BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
2003: A COMPARISON OF 10 COUNTRIES, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.international
budget.org/themes/BudTrans/English.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET TRANSPARENCY 2003].
176. FÖLSCHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 21.
177. Id. at 46, 49–51.
178. Id. at 49–51. Note that this project led to a further study of budget transparency in
several African countries. See generally INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ACCOUNTABILITY IN S.
AFR., BUDGET TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION: FIVE AFRICAN CASE STUDIES (Dec.
17, 2003), available at http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=output_details.asp%3FR
ID%3D511%26oplang%3Den%26TID%3D8%260TID%3D6.
179. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of
the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1639–44
(2005).
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term budget frameworks, which are nonetheless explicitly included in the
IMF Code.
Budget transparency legislation at the country level has tended to track
the IMF and OECD approaches—it generally makes no explicit reference to social justice indicators. For example, the Australian Charter requires an assessment of distributional impact not for current generations,
but for future ones alone. One exception is the U.K. Code for Fiscal Stability, which includes fairness as one of the principles that must govern
fiscal policy. It defines “fairness” as follows: “[t]he principle of fairness
means that, so far as reasonably practical, the Government shall seek to
operate fiscal policy in a way that takes into account the financial effects
on future generations, as well as its distributional impact on the current
population.”180 The mandate to consider future generations relates back
to the issue of discipline over current social spending. However, the reference to distributional impact on the current population at least creates
an opening for scrutiny of the distributive impact of budgets. This potential is not realized in practice, because none of the requisite public reports under the Code must include a distributional analysis. According to
a 2004 report, the U.K. Treasury has, on some occasions, provided information about the impact of its proposals on different income
groups.181 The report recommends making this mandatory:
There is no reason why the Code . . . should not contain an explicit requirement that, where significant and possible, the distributional impact
on the current population of new measures should be made publicly
available. Similarly estimates of the impact on marginal deduction rates
across the whole population should also be provided . . . . It is also desirable that indicative information be provided as early as possible in
the consultation process rather than simply being provided when all of
the details of the policy have been finalized.182

The obvious problem with giving governments discretion to publish
such information selectively is that they will tend to do so only when it is
politically convenient. Even if distributive analyses were required for all
180. Code for Fiscal Stability, 1998, c. 36, § 2(7) (Eng.). The other principles governing fiscal policy are transparency, stability, responsibility, and efficiency. See id. c. 36, §
155. For example, “equity” features prominently among the principles governing fiscal
policy in Ontario. See Fiscal Transparency and Accountability Act, 2004 S.O., ch. 27
(Can.). See also Mary Condon & Lisa Philipps, Transnational Market Governance and
Economic Citizenship: New Frontiers for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 105, 140–46 (2005) (discussing the U.K. and Ontario, Canada, legislation as well as
the IMF’s efforts to have countries adopt its Code).
181. Emmerson, Frayne & Love, supra note 10, at 29.
182. Id.
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new policies, though, there is concern about how to ensure a degree of
rigor and objectivity in the way such data is presented. This points to the
need for effective oversight of the executive by legislative and civil society actors, which we discuss in the next Part.
In Pakistan, the transparency provisions of the Fiscal Responsibility
and Debt Limitation Act of 2005 are based on the IMF Code and do not
require disclosure of any distributional data.183 However, equity issues
are addressed in a different way. The statute’s deficit and debt reduction
targets are subject to an exception for “social and poverty alleviation related expenditures,” which are not to fall below 4.5% of GDP in any given year.184 The term “social and poverty related expenditure” is defined
to include, inter alia, health, education, and “such other expenditures as
may be specified in the National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper from
time to time.”185 The government must report on its compliance with
these objectives in an annual fiscal policy statement; some account must
be given as to the amount of budgetary spending that qualifies as “social
and poverty related.”186 The IBP reported in 2008 that Pakistan’s budget
did include information “highlighting the impact of key policies intended
to alleviate poverty, but some details are excluded.”187 However, the IBP
report indicates that the Pakistani government does not publicize any
analysis of the distribution of the tax burden.188
Tax expenditures are one aspect of fiscal policy that cries out for more
open distributive analysis. The IMF Code recommends that tax expenditures be reported in the budget documents, but does not prescribe exactly
what information should be reported.189 It is common, particularly for
183. ESTANDARDS FORUM, BEST PRACTICES REPORT: PAKISTAN 3 (2008), available at
http://www.estandardsforum.org/servlet/PrintPDFReport?country_id=136&bpr=on (indicating that Pakistan merely expressed intent to adopt full disclosure practices, but the
practice has yet to be implemented).
184. Pakistan Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, Gazette of Pakistan, No.
VI, June 13, 2005, § 3(3)(c). This provision also states that education- and health-related
expenditures should double as a percentage of GDP over ten years. Id. Section 9 of the
Act protects social and poverty alleviation spending from any cuts that must be made to
meet deficit and debt targets. Id. § 9(b).
185. Id. § 2(l).
186. See id. §§ 4, 6.
187. INT’L BUDGET P’SHIP, OPEN BUDGET QUESTIONNAIRE: PAKISTAN 42 (2008), available at http://openbudgetindex.org/files/IBPQuestionnaire2008Pakistan.pdf.
188. Id. at 43. In contrast to Pakistan, the U.K. government fully discloses “policies
intended to alleviate poverty” and a “detailed analysis of the distribution of the tax burden.” See INT’L BUDGET P’SHIP, OPEN BUDGET QUESTIONNAIRE: UNITED KINGDOM 44–45
(2007), available at http://openbudgetindex.org/files/IBPQuestionnaire2008UK.pdf.
189. 2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, § 3.1.3. Since its establishment by Stanley Surrey
in the United States during the 1960s, the concept of tax expenditures, which compares
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developed countries, to provide some kind of report that compares tax
expenditures to a defined, baseline, “normal” income or consumption
tax. This is required, for example, in the Australian Charter.190 However,
the reports are frequently not well integrated into the budget process,
include inadequate estimates of lost revenue, and contain little or no evidence about the distributive impact of particular tax concessions.191 This
weakens their usefulness in improving transparency.
Tax expenditure reporting could be strengthened significantly in developed and developing countries to illuminate the benefits received by
different social groups and firms. India began releasing tax expenditure
reports with its 2006–2007 budget, and in 2008–2009, it included a distributive analysis of corporate tax expenditures showing that the smallest
firms were receiving the least benefits from these concessions.192 The
Nigerian Fiscal Responsibility Law 2007, Section 11(3)(c)(iii), calls for
an “aggregate tax expenditure projection” on a rolling three-year time
horizon.193 Section 29(1) states that “[a]ny proposed tax expenditure shall
be accompanied by an evaluation of its budgetary and financial implications in the year it becomes effective and in the three subsequent financial
years,” and in the event of unplanned revenue losses, such expenditure
requires offsetting measures “such as tax rate raises and expansion of the

the income tax law with a “benchmark” income tax said to be an ideal income tax system,
has had a primarily political purpose, to draw legislators’ attention to the many concessions, exemptions, and other incentives in the U.S. tax code and to the implicit “cost to
revenue,” or revenue foregone, as a result of these concessions. For all of the flaws that
can be identified with respect to the tax expenditure concept, this is still its most valuable
function, and it is thus best understood as a strategic intervention into the budget process.
190. Charter of Budget Honesty Act, 1998, pt. 5, div. 1, cl. 12(1)(d) (Austl.). We do
not propose here to enter the debate about how to define the baseline for identifying and
measuring tax expenditures, but instead, see tax expenditure reporting as an additional
and useful tool for analyzing and debating the distributional burdens and benefits of fiscal
policy.
191. HANA POLACKOVA BRIXI, CHRISTIAN VALENDUC & ZHICHENG LI SWIFT, TAX
EXPENDITURES: SHEDDING LIGHT ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING THROUGH THE TAX
SYSTEM—LESSONS FROM DEVELOPED AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES (2003); Mark Burton,
Making the Australian Tax Expenditures Statement an Effective Policy Instrument—From
Fiscal Record to Transparent Report, 8 J. OF AUSTRALIAN TAX’N 1 (2005).
192. See GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FIN., UNION BUDGET RECEIPTS BUDGET 2008–
2009: REVENUE FOREGONE UNDER THE CENTRAL TAX SYSTEM: FINANCIAL YEARS 2006–
07 AND 2007–08, at Annex 12, 45 (2008), available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub200809/
rec/annex12.pdf; GOV’T OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FIN., UNION BUDGET 2006–2007: TAX
EXPENDITURE UNDER THE CENTRAL TAX SYSTEM: FINANCIAL YEAR 2004–2005, at Annex
12, 45 (2006), available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2006-07/rec/annex12.pdf.
193. Fiscal Responsibility Act, Gazette of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 126,
Dec. 31, 2007, § 11(3)(c)(iii). See also Rising Hopes, supra note 127.
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tax base.”194 This type of initiative could help build support for basebroadening reforms in developing countries, which have been identified
as crucial for increasing the resources available for antipoverty and other
types of development spending.
The strategy of using fiscal transparency and tax expenditure reporting
to build domestic political support for base-broadening tax reforms could
have some advantages over other strategies that focus on reducing tax
competition through a more international coordination of tax policy.
Many international tax scholars have criticized developing countries’ use
of investment tax incentives, pointing out their negative effects on corporate tax revenue and on the efficiency and fairness of tax systems.195 The
persistence of this form of tax competition has led some scholars to recommend changes in the way developed countries tax business income
earned abroad by their resident multinationals. They have advocated eliminating any benefits from the host countries’ tax incentives, thereby
freeing these countries from pressure to engage in self-destructive tax
competition.196 Others have argued just the opposite, that developed
countries should engage in more tax sparing to preserve the value of
these incentives, on the basis that this may help developing countries
attract much-needed investment and accord them greater autonomy over
domestic tax policy.197 Promoting more transparency at the country level
with respect to the cost and distributive impact of tax expenditures could
help to resolve this impasse by enabling a country’s own citizens to challenge incentives that shift the burden of taxation onto local firms and
individuals without achieving any clear benefits. Similarly, especially in
developed countries, tax expenditures are a significant way for governments to deliver government spending programs.198 Requiring govern194. Fiscal Responsibility Act § 29(1).
195. See, e.g., Michael Keen & Alejandro Simone, Tax Policy in Developing Countries: Some Lessons from the 1990s and Some Challenges Ahead, in HELPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOP: THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY 302 (Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict J. Clements & Gabriela Inchauste eds., 2004).
196. See, e.g., Reuvan S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A
Retrospective After a Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783 (2009).
197. See, e.g., Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and
Growth: Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX. REV. 161,
192–94 (2003). The traditional U.S. view against tax sparing was also questioned by
Karen R. Brown, Book Review, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View, 32 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 311 (1999).
198. Burton, supra note 191. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO NO.
05-690, TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND
NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 19–42 (2005); Zhicheng Li Swift, Managing the Effects on
National Budgets (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3927, 2006).
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ments to publicize with the budget an analysis of these effects would radically increase the overall transparency of fiscal policy.
The gender budgeting initiatives undertaken in several countries, including India and South Africa, provide yet another angle on distributive
transparency.199 The Platform of Action adopted at the 1995 U.N. Fourth
World Conference on Women, in Beijing, called on governments to “facilitate, at appropriate levels, more open and transparent budget
processes”200 and mandated “the integration of a gender perspective in
budgetary decisions on policies and programs.”201 In response, the United Nations and other international agencies organized to support many
local gender budgeting projects at both the civil society and governmental level.202 The basic starting point for these projects is the fact that even
though fiscal policy often purports to be gender neutral on its face, its
impact is seldom gender neutral because of the different economic status
and roles of men and women. A variety of methods are used to reveal
and analyze the differential impacts of taxes and spending on women and
men, in terms of both the distribution of costs and benefits, and behavioral effects (for example, marginal choices between paid and unpaid
labor, or the effectiveness of business incentives). In addition, many initiatives focus on increasing women’s participation in budget processes
as well as the capacity of civil society organizations to critically analyze
budget documents from a gender perspective. Advocates of gender budgeting often use the language of transparency in describing its value. In
199. See generally DEBBIE BUDLENDER & GUY HEWITT, GENDER BUDGETS MAKE
MORE CENTS: COUNTRY STUDIES AND GOOD PRACTICE (2003); U.N. DEV. FUND FOR
WOMEN, GENDER BUDGET INITIATIVES: STRATEGIES, CONCEPTS AND EXPERIENCE 113
(2001), available at http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/gender_budgets_cd/Budgets%20CD%20
subsection%204.1/4.1c%20Gender%20budget%20initiatives%20UNIFEM%20link%20for
%204.4f.pdf; Vibhuti Patel, Gender Budgeting in India, Paper presented at National
Workshop on Gender Budgeting—An Effective Tool for Achieving Women’s Empowerment (Apr. 15, 2007), available at http://www.gender-budgets.org/content/blogcategory/
84/156/.
200. Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Report of the Fourth
World Conference on Women, ¶ 165(i), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996) [hereinafter Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women].
201. Id. ¶ 345.
202. See Lisa Philipps, Gender Budgets and Tax Policy-Making: Contrasting Canadian and Australian Experiences, 24 LAW IN CONTEXT 143 (2006). See also Report of the
Fourth World Conference on Women, supra note 200, ¶¶ 165(i), 345 (reporting that governments pledged to “[f]acilitate, at appropriate levels, more open and transparent budget
processes” and emphasizing the need for “the integration of a gender perspective in budgetary decisions on policies and programs”); Janet Stotsky, Gender Budgeting (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/232, Oct. 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06232.pdf.

844

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:3

particular, the U.N. Financing for Development Conference has recently
emphasized the importance of including a gender lens in the analysis of
fiscal policy.203 This is in stark contrast with the standards of transparency articulated by the IMF and OECD, which do not mention gender impact as a relevant fact to be reported by governments. With the exception
of the IBP/IDASA report, gender also does not receive any explicit mention in the NGO-led budget transparency exercises.
V. FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIC EMPOWERMENT
Our genealogy of fiscal transparency indicates that the interventions of
the IMF and OECD are directed mostly at promoting fiscal discipline
and capital market efficiency. The institutional codes and best practices
pay little attention to the democratic accountability aspects of transparency in budgeting, an area of government policy making that, as we
have demonstrated elsewhere, is already prone to ignore citizens in favor
of economic expertise and markets.204 While the IMF and OECD pay
some lip service to citizen accountability, a detailed examination of the
IMF Code and OECD Best Practices reveals a democratic deficit in relation to both the expected audience for fiscal transparency information
and the overall understanding of the purpose and processes of budgeting.
If the budget is, as the OECD suggests, the most important policy document of a government, the question of who receives information and is
empowered to participate is crucial for the legitimacy, fairness, and sustainability of budget decisions.
The IMF Code itself does not state who the expected audience is for
fiscal information. The accompanying Manual notes that transparency
involves openness to “the public” about “the structure and functions of
government, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and fiscal
projections.”205 The “public,” as explained by the Manual, incorporates
four distinct audiences. First are governments themselves (past, current,
and future), which should utilize budget analysis to improve economic
decision making.206 Second are “citizens” and the goal of fiscal transparency here is to “giv[e] them the information they need to hold their government accountable for its policy choices.”207 The third audience is “international capital markets,” and the last is the IMF itself, in its role in
203. Doha Declaration on Financing for Development, supra note 36, at 3–6.
204. See generally Condon & Philipps, supra note 180; Philipps, Discursive Deficits,
supra note 33; Stewart, Global Trajectories, supra note 33; Stewart & Jogarajan, supra
note 33.
205. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 6.
206. Id. at 1.
207. Id.
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the economic “surveillance” of member countries “to assess economic
vulnerabilities.”208 The explicit recognition of citizens in the IMF Code is
a significant change from the first edition, released in 1998, which emphasized “surveillance of economic policies by country authorities, financial markets, and international institutions.”209 Indeed, according to a
note in the 2001 edition of the Manual, “there is an issue as to the language(s) in which information should be made available,” and this note
even suggested that “it is unclear whether countries should routinely publish fiscal information, and economic information more generally, in a
commonly-used language.”210 This note recognized, though, that “for
countries seeking access to international capital markets, there is likely to
be some benefit from translating key documents and reports for release
simultaneously with national language versions.”211
The OECD Best Practices also addresses the role of citizens, in particular, by requiring publication of reports and active promotion of citizens’ and NGOs’ understanding of the budget process.212 Both the IMF
Code and OECD Best Practices find that the most important way to
achieve accountability to citizens is, unsurprisingly, through legislative
review of an executive budget.213 As explained in Part III, Section A, for
such accountability to have any content, this approach implicitly requires
a democratic legislature.
While the IBP and other organizations involved in budget assessment
consider accountability to the legislature important, they have a different
vision of democratic control over fiscal processes. The IBP Open Budget
Initiative is explicitly oriented towards empowering relatively disadvantaged constituencies to engage with budgetary policy, though it is also
concerned with exposing fiscal corruption or unrealistic and imprudent
budgeting. NGO researchers in Latin America frame the issue as follows:
“[p]articipation by the citizenry throughout the budget process is indispensable, not only to strengthen the democracy of a country, but also
because it represents an effective way to ensure that the population’s

208. Id. at 1–2.
209. Int’l Monetary Fund, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency—
Declaration of Principles (1998), reprinted in Int’l Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the
Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (Apr.
16, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/1998/041698A.HTM.
210. INT’L MONETARY FUND, MANUAL ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY pt. II, para. 57 n.49
(2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/manual.pdf.
211. See id.
212. OECD Best Practices, supra note 1, at 8, 14.
213. 2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, §§ 2.1.1, 4.3.2; OECD Best Practices, supra note
1, at 14.
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most pressing needs are covered within the government’s budget.”214 In
the index these researchers prepared, citizen participation received the
lowest score of all its variables.215
Although fiscal transparency laws and codes acknowledge the role of
the legislature in constraining the executive from undisciplined spending
and taxation, other rules seek to constrain the legislature by institutionalizing stronger executive control over many budget decisions.216 The
common factor in these apparently contradictory checks and balances is
not accountability as such, but fiscal discipline to establish credibility for
the market.217
If the discussion is refocused towards the fundamental purpose of a
budget, namely, to establish politically legitimate and sustainable distributional decisions for a country, the meaning and uses of fiscal transparency may be reexamined. Fiscal transparency norms have the potential
to expand the political space for budget decision making, allowing citizens to participate in more than just elections for legislative representatives in a given electoral cycle. Effective fiscal transparency norms could
operate to connect fiscal policy makers with existing networks of governmental departments, businesses, civil society, and local communities
in order to more effectively design, assess, and implement fiscal decisions. Transparency norms and frameworks should seek to increase the
knowledge of ordinary citizens and “civil society” about fiscal policy
decisions and their impact on the distribution of benefits and burdens
throughout society.
The use of fiscal transparency norms to increase participation in budgeting fits with a global trend to encourage public participation in policy
making. As a broad principle, the United Nations has stated that “widespread participation in decision-making processes” is important in enabling “the creation of the critical mass of support needed to change institutions.”218 The second half of the 1990s saw a massive enhancement of
214. BUDGET TRANSPARENCY 2005, supra note 175, at 16.
215. Index of Five Latin American Countries, supra note 3, at 2.
216. See, e.g., Alesina & Perotti, supra note 27; 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at
21–22.
217. Mario Marcel & Marcelo Tokman, Building a Consensus for Fiscal Reform: The
Chilean Case, 2(3) OECD J. ON BUDGETING 2002, at 35, 37. This recent and insightful
article about fiscal reform in Chile emphasizes the combined macroeconomic, managerial, and political role of budgets and the need, in the longer term, to establish a political
consensus through increasing and strengthening the contributions of the Congress, in
addition to a strong government leader and a strict fiscal rule. Id. at 37.
218. U.N., WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY 2000: TRENDS AND POLICIES IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 211 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/WESS%
20since%201948/world%20economic%20and%20social%20survey%202000.pdf.
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consultation on expenditure policies in PRSPs associated with conditional loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and aid donors. This has been
called a “paradigm shift” for development policy.219 A concept of “participatory development” has become the norm, at least as a matter of rhetoric, in the broader development discourse, whether carried out by multilateral development agencies or NGOs.220 Using Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Cambodia, Tanzania, and Vietnam as case studies, a recent evaluation of
PRSPs and their interaction with budget formation concluded that PRSPs
have enhanced public education about government policies and expenditures and, to some extent, have increased citizen participation in budget
processes.221
Despite this new emphasis on participation, some critics have suggested that citizen participation in economic and fiscal policymaking is
not well-embedded in existing political structures, such as parliaments.222
A recent study criticizes the PRSP process as being insufficiently linked
to budget and government fiscal agencies.223 It observes that the Ministry
of Finance is not always given a lead role in the PRSP process, which is
often established in a separate ministry.224 This is likely to lead to a failure of the Ministry of Finance to “own” the PRSP process. Such a “weak
link between the PRSP and the budgets” is identified as a crucial problem in many countries; the solution seems to be to establish an MTEF,
but doing so successfully, as outlined above, is very challenging.225 Problems also arise in ensuring that local governments participate in both
PRSP formulation and budget decisions at a national level, although
PRSPs are supposed to be driven by local-community consultation, and
tax systems are increasingly decentralized. Furthermore, it is rare for
consultation in a PRSP process to involve a discussion of taxation policy
219. See Fantu Cheru, Building and Supporting PRSPs in Africa: What Has Worked
Well So Far? What Needs Changing?, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 355, 364 (2006). Regarding
Australia, see Mark Burton, Is Participatory Tax Transparency in Australia Achievable?,
43 TAX NOTES INT’L 333 (2006) [hereinafter Burton, Participatory Tax Transparency].
220. See, e.g., DEEPA NARAYAN & LYRA SRINIVASAN, WORLD BANK, PARTICIPATORY
DEVELOPMENT TOOL KIT: MATERIALS TO FACILITATE COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT (1994);
Maia Green, Participatory Development and the Appropriation of Agency in Southern
Tanzania, 20 CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 67–89 (2000).
221. Rosa Alonso et al., PRSPs and Budgets: A Synthesis of Five Case Studies, in
BUDGET SUPPORT AS MORE EFFECTIVE AID? RECENT EXPERIENCES AND EMERGING
LESSONS, supra note 92, at 155, 159.
222. See Condon & Philipps, supra note 180, at 128; Kevin M. Morrison & Mathew
M. Singer, Inequality and Deliberative Development: Revisiting Bolivia’s Experience
with the PRSP, 25 DEV. POL’Y REV. 721 (2007).
223. Stevens, supra note 9, at 8–9.
224. Id.
225. See Cheru, supra note 219, at 362.
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(as opposed to spending). Attention needs to be paid to identifying “mechanisms of accountability” that could incorporate the poor into the tax
reform debate and “enhance their ability to articulate their interests and
advance a progressive system of public finance, both in taxation and expenditures.”226 The disconnect between participation in the PRSP process
and the budget process is an indication of the inadequacy of fiscal transparency norms, which have tended to focus heavily on prudence and discipline, rather than the legitimacy of budgetary policy.
Consultation mechanisms have also become popular in many countries
as a means of securing political support for tax reform.227 The IMF Code
calls for adequate consultation in reform,228 but surprisingly, the OECD
Best Practices does not. In developed countries, consultation about technical or detailed policy elements of tax reform is frequently carried out
with the private sector. The advantages of such consultation may include
provision of an external expert eye to identify issues, uncertainties, or
problems with the law, and to provide examples and information about
taxpayer practices, accounting, and other compliance issues. The expert
may also ensure professional or business support for tax legislation and
its effective implementation, which is likely to be politically important.
As Gordon and Thuronyi have noted, less attention has been paid to the
process of designing and drafting tax legislation in developing countries.229
Consultation on aspects of policy, or the way a tax law or policy is implemented or administered, is usually carried out with business groups
and professional tax advisors, rather than with a broad spectrum of taxpayers. However, consultation targeted to particular business sectors or
taxpayers may collapse into a “thin” politics of taxation, which, as described by Moore and Rakner, is essentially special interest groups nego-

226. See RICARDO SABATES & AARON SCHNEIDER, INST. OF DEV. STUD. AT THE UNIV.
ESSEX, TAXATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE POOR 5 (2003), available at http://www2.
ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/Tax%20account%20poor-final%20report.pdf. See also Alonso et al.,
supra note 221, at 162.
227. See CEDRIC SANDFORD, SUCCESSFUL TAX REFORM: LESSONS FROM AN ANALYSIS
OF TAX REFORM IN SIX COUNTRIES (1993); Thomas E. McDonnell, Toward Getting It
Right: Reflections on 50 Years of the Tax Legislative Process in Canada, 43 CAN. TAX. J.
1131, 1133 (1995). Miranda Stewart, Consultation in Business Tax Reform: Towards an
Effective Tax Policy Network, in EXECUTING THE INCOME TAX 249 (Graeme Cooper ed.,
2008) [hereinafter Stewart, Consultation in Business Tax Reform] (discussing the “tax
policy network” with respect to taxation of the corporate sector in Australia).
228. 2007 IMF CODE, supra note 2, § 1.2.3.
229. See Richard K. Gordon & Victor Thuronyi, Tax Legislative Process, in TAX LAW
DESIGN AND DRAFTING 1, 2 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 2000).
OF
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tiating behind closed doors.230 The “tax policy network” identified by
Stewart with respect to taxation of the corporate sector in Australia is not
open to broader citizen engagement, although it appears to have contributed to some successful business tax reforms.231 Ideally, a fiscal transparency law would build institutional procedures and mechanisms that
would help ensure that consultation in policy formation is public to the
greatest extent possible and that would enable a wide spectrum of taxpayers an opportunity to engage in the process.
A lack of consultation on tax reform often seems to go hand in hand
with a failure to respect taxpayer rights and procedural or appellate
processes concerning taxation, particularly in developing countries.232 In
this context, the IMF Code’s incorporation of a requirement to ensure
taxpayer rights and due process is likely to increase taxpayers’ capacity
to engage in tax reform processes, though this capacity is somewhat indirect. Business and taxpayer associations may not exist or may be poorly
educated or resourced. There is also a need for “skilling up” both parliamentarians and the wider population in all countries, so as to enable them
to participate in consultation about tax reforms that will affect them and
the broader public interest.233 Gordon and Thuronyi have also identified
inadequate coordination between the legislative branch and tax policy
makers in the treasury or executive branch. They argue that it is important to both educate and consult with members of parliament, perhaps via
a parliamentary committee, and with parliamentary staff.234 Formal interest groups and business associations may be weak or subject to cooption, thus creating an inadequate demand for broad consultation and
hiding the influence of smaller groups.235
The claim in support of consultation in budget policy is that it enhances information sharing, accountability, institutional knowledge, and
public understanding, which in turn strengthen the quality and legitimacy
of the budget.236 Often, however, there is an assumed dichotomy between
230. Moore & Rakner, supra note 5, at 1. See also Avi Nov, The ‘Bidding War’ to
Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX. REV.
835, 847 (2006) (discussing foreign direct investment as an example of the dominant
dynamic that corrupts tax policy in the developing world).
231. Stewart, Consultation in Business Tax Reform, supra note 227.
232. See, e.g., Luoga, supra note 166 (referring to more than twelve studies of the
Tanzanian tax system since 1990, none of which addressed the need for consultation or
the legal framework for taxation).
233. See Burton, Participatory Tax Transparency, supra note 219, at 335.
234. See Gordon & Thuronyi, supra note 229, at 8.
235. Lise Rakner, The Politics of Revenue Mobilization: Explaining Continuity in Namibian Tax Policies, 28 F. FOR DEV. STUD. 125, 135 (2001).
236. See 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 5–6, 27.
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content and process in fiscal policy reform. That is, it is assumed that
consultation will not affect the content of reforms (which can be determined by reference to abstract or “ideal” technical policy choices), but
will simply enable the refining of a policy and assure more effective implementation of that policy. This assumption is consistent with what has
been termed the “technical idea” approach to a development intervention,
an approach used across the broad field of development and according to
which “effective political engagement is evidenced by receptivity to the
technical idea and support of its implementation.”237 However, the serious implementation of process-oriented reforms is likely to lead to significant compromises in the ultimate content of tax and spending proposals. The discourse of transparency reflects an underlying tension between
the drive for “best practice” policy and fiscal discipline, on the one hand,
and the need to achieve a legitimate fiscal bargain among citizens, on the
other.238
There is a striking contrast between the OECD’s approach to fiscal
transparency, which only marginally considers participation, and the
considerable attention the OECD has paid in recent years to public participation in Member States’ policy making more generally.239 In a recent, substantial document on participatory policy making, the OECD
identifies three different types of relationships, based on information,
consultation, and active participation, respectively: “a one-way relationship in which government produces and delivers information for use by
citizens”; “a two-way relationship in which citizens provide feedback to
government” on a defined issue; and “a relation based on partnership
with government, in which citizens actively engage in defining the
process and content of policy-making.”240 It seems safe to say that most
237. Andrews, supra note 139.
238. See, e.g., Stewart, Tax Policy Transfers, supra note 40.
239. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CITIZENS AS PARTNERS: INFORMATION, CONSULTATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING (2001) [hereinafter CITIZENS AS PARTNERS]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EVALUATING PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING (2005).
240. CITIZENS AS PARTNERS, supra note 239, at 23 (emphasis added). Some commentators have called for increased and more widespread participation in tax policy making.
See Mark Burton, Democratic Tax Administration, in FURTHER GLOBAL CHALLENGES IN
TAX ADMINISTRATION (Margaret McKerchar & Michael Walpole eds., 2006); Burton,
Participatory Tax Transparency, supra note 219. In contrast to the call for widespread
“citizen” participation, Stewart has found that enhanced consultation in business tax policy making in Australia has certainly strengthened a “shared ownership” of the tax system
between business and government, but within a closed and tightly held “network” of
interdependence that does not incorporate citizens or civil society more broadly. Stewart,
Consultation in Business Tax Reform, supra note 227.
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efforts at engaging citizens in tax reform initiatives or budget processes
do not rise to the third level of active participation, and many involve
only the provision of information to those who already have the skills to
understand and utilize it.
An alternative view of a successful development intervention by international experts or institutions is targeted towards local “ownership” and
warns against the wholesale implementation of external technical ideas
or blueprints without adequate local consideration. This view suggested
by Andrews, involves the creation of “space in which the developing
entity can identify, define, and solve its own problems.”241 The dominant
fiscal transparency norms are not aimed at creating “space” for political
negotiation or engagement concerning the budget.
The IBP and other fiscal policy NGOs form part of an emergent civil
society network within States and in the international arena that aims to
fill this democratic deficit, but currently operates with limited communication and coherence among the different participants. The importance of
civil society or independent critique of budget policy has been noted in a
variety of contexts, including tax expenditures and gender budgeting.
Without external monitoring and pressure, governments are unlikely to
engage in meaningful disclosure or self-criticism of their policies. However, also well-known are the challenges of developing a civil society
network that is both socially diverse and well-informed about fiscal policy. The international codes fail not only to prioritize information or
processes that would serve economically marginalized groups in the
wider civil society, but also to foster critical analysis by those interested
in problems of poverty and inequality.
Our call for “political space” and for increased citizen participation in
fiscal policy (and other policy aimed at development) is grounded in a
notion of “deliberative democracy.”242 Philip Pettit has argued that deliberative democracy should combine two dimensions: first, representative
“contestatory institutions,” and second, institutions that remove some
decisions from the immediately political domain, but are designed to

241. Andrews, supra note 139, at 95.
242. Although it has a longer history in democratic theory, the theory around deliberative democracy is being made simultaneously with various experiments in participation
and consultation taking place with respect to development and policy. See, e.g., Joshua
Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan P. Hamlin & Phillip Petit eds., 2002); James D. Fearon,
Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 44, 44–45 (Jon Elster ed.,
1998). In the development context, it has been termed “deliberative development.” See,
e.g., Morrison & Singer, supra note 222.
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empower participation.243 Relevant to our discussion of budget transparency, “contestatory institutions” ensure that “the people” are “individually enabled to act as editors of the laws and policies that the representatives author—and author in their collective name.”244 On the other
hand, the “depoliticizing” institutions “reduce” the “contestatory burden,” including constitutional constraints and consultative procedures.245
At their best, fiscal transparency laws and other laws relating to budgeting would empower “contestation”—participation in fiscal decision
making—by informing and enabling citizens, while at the same time
providing adequate constraints and procedures to achieve “realistic” outcomes.246 These constraints could include the use of an MTEF, and requirements to assess the achievement of development goals and to weigh
distributive impact on both current and future generations. The Nigerian
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 includes a number of provisions that
gesture in this direction, though their impact on the ground is yet to be
determined. For example, the Act creates a Fiscal Responsibility Commission charged with implementing the statute and empowered to demand relevant information from any person.247 The Commission has ten
members, with one appointed to represent organized labor, and another
to represent “[c]ivil [s]ociety engaged in causes relating to probity,
transparency[,] and good governance.”248 The law also provides for timely and wide publication of its many reports, including via the Internet.249
Most interestingly, it gives standing to ordinary citizens to seek prerogative orders or other remedies in the Federal High Court to enforce the
law.250
We call on the international financial institutions (“IFIs”) to turn their
attention to fostering “contestatory” processes and networks both locally
and internationally. What best practices could be identified at the country
level for involving and providing resources to civil society? Could transparency be broadened by promoting more effective parliamentary over-

243. Pettit, supra note 6, at 52–65.
244. Id. at 61.
245. Id. at 62–63.
246. See James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, Transparency, Political Polarization,
and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries, 50 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 530, 531 (2006)
(conducting a rigorous inquiry into the relationship between electoral politics and fiscal
transparency).
247. Fiscal Responsibility Act, Gazette of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 126,
Dec. 31, 2007, pt. 1.
248. Id. § 5(1)(b).
249. Id. §§ 30(2), 44(5), 48(1).
250. Id. § 51.
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sight of fiscal policy impacts, including the wider use of committees and
local community consultations?
VI. FORMALISATION, META-INSTITUTIONS, AND GLOBAL NORMS
This Article has sought to analyze and critique budget transparency
laws through the lens of social justice and democratic values. In this final
Part, we discuss the role of law in the network of codes, standards, and
regulators dealing with fiscal transparency and operating at both an international and national level. We also explore the import of fiscal transparency for the broader project of “ruling the world.” Our analysis suggests that the international institutions, and even NGOs, put considerable
faith in law as a vehicle for mandating transparency and accountability.
However, scholars of law and development have expressed skepticism
about the role of law in development and the ability of law reform to enhance or influence development.251
The IMF Code and OECD Best Practices are prime examples of the increasing role of “soft law” in transnational economic governance. Soft
law can be defined as standards or norms developed by quasi-public international institutions, with a view to influencing policy development
and practice at the state level so as to convince markets of sound economic policy-making.252 They are just one element of a broader network
of standards and codes at the international level aimed at establishing
“good governance” norms so as to achieve “macroeconomic stability and
high-quality growth.”253 Even the “hardest” set of global rules, the Maastricht fiscal rules for the euro area, operates in practice predominantly as
a set of procedural and reporting requirements.254
The IMF Code and OECD Best Practices also seek to embed and legitimate other global norms or standards with respect to government fiscal,
monetary, and investment policies. The IMF Manual notes that the Code
is “one of [twelve] standards that have been recognized by the international community” (and endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank) in
various guises.255 The Code is also supported by private sector investors
as one of twelve key international standards deserving of priority implementation by governments.256 The OECD Best Practices forms an ele251. Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 7.
252. See Christians, supra note 40; Schick, supra note 11 (discussing “hard rules” for
fiscal restraint).
253. 2001 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 1.
254. EU Press Release, supra note 30.
255. Id. at 1.
256. See Financial Stability Forum, 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems,
http://www.fsforum.org/cos/key_standards.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
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ment of its overall Policy Framework for Investment. In addition to proposing ten policy “domains” that have the most impact on investment,
and setting out questions or issues for governments to consider in each
domain, the Framework seeks “to define the respective responsibilities of
government, business and other stakeholders and to pinpoint where international co-operation can most effectively redress weaknesses in the
investment environment.”257 Transparency in policy development and
implementation is one of three core principles that underlie the Framework, together with “policy coherence” and regular evaluation of policies’ impact.258
The expansion of efforts in monitoring aid and government expenditures is a part of the World Bank’s efforts to monitor and implement
“governance” reforms worldwide. These efforts are epitomized by the
World Bank’s Governance Indicators, which seeks to measure governance quality across six dimensions and 212 countries and territories.259
Most of these dimensions could incorporate fiscal transparency, but it
has not always been the subject of attention.260 The Indicators draw on a
range of institutional, governmental, nongovernmental, and academic
sources for components of data, and these have recently begun to include
monitoring of fiscal transparency.261

257. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT 11
(2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/31/36671400.pdf. One question that
arises is to what extent nongovernment actors, in particular transnational corporations
(but also, increasingly, charities, NGOs, and the international institutions themselves), are
also called upon to be “transparent.” It is arguable that transnational corporations face
much lower expectations of transparency despite their very significant impact on the
economy and society, although it must be noted that transparency norms are also being
urged on the corporate sector by the OECD and, of course, by national regulators.
258. Id.
259. Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2007, at 1 (World Bank Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. 4654,
2008), available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/GovernanceMattersVII.pdf.
260. The “dimensions of governance” assessed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators are “Voice and Accountability,” “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism,”
“Government Effectiveness,” “Regulatory Quality,” “Rule of Law,” and “Control of
Corruption.” World Bank, Governance and Anti-Corruption: Worldwide Governance
Indicators 1996–2008 Interactive, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (last
visited Mar. 28, 2009).
261. For example, one data source for the Worldwide Governance Indicators is the
Institutional Profiles Database, a project of the French Government examining eightyfive developed and developing countries. Commenced in 2006, this project includes an
examination of the transparency of fiscal and tax policy, tax evasion, and regulatory quality. See Kaufmann et al., supra note 259, at 59, tbl.A21. The Indicators also draw on the
IBP Index. Id. at 63, tbl.A25.
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Together with a host of international regulators or observers led by the
IFIs, these standards and codes create an international web of metaregulation (of States by States and nonstate actors) that has the primary goal
of ensuring that governments are more fully subjected to the discipline of
well-informed markets. As illustrated in this Article, this range of international standards can infiltrate local policy making in a variety of ways,
including country surveillance by the IMF, creation of an OECD database then used by academic researchers to rank country performance,
and incentives for developing countries to participate as a way of demonstrating good governance.
In particular countries, substantive fiscal transparency norms may be
embedded in a legislative framework—that is, may assume a formal legal character—but they are more often built into “soft” procedural rules
or codes that governments will adhere to because of political, rather than
legal, constraints. Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have
each chosen not to legislate hard fiscal targets or rules. Instead, they apply transparency requirements to impose fiscal discipline. Many of these
requirements, such as medium-term frameworks, are not legislated, although all three countries legislate reporting, auditing, and institutional
independence requirements.262 By contrast, many developing countries
have attempted to combine hard legal restrictions for deficits with a
range of legal and nonlegal transparency obligations. Mike Stevens reminds us that it is important to look at the history of budgeting laws and
processes in a country when analyzing and seeking to “modernize” the
budgeting frameworks of many developing countries along the lines proposed by the IMF and OECD.263 Some countries, like India and South
Africa, provide a much more diverse set of reports and information than
is required in their legal systems, largely in response to legislators’ concerns and an active, vocal civil society and NGO sector. The effectiveness and content of fiscal transparency norms are both largely shaped by
domestic politics and pre-existing institutions, not by formal laws.
In practice, country transparency laws and norms, even if strictly nonbinding, may have the effect of binding future governments in all but the
most extreme circumstances: “in practice it is also the case that given
that the [United Kingdom] now has a code in place it might be very difficult for a future government to remove or substantially loosen the code
without significant loss to its economic credibility.”264 A future government may only succeed in removing a fiscal code in a time of crisis. The
262. 2007 IMF MANUAL, supra note 2, at 80.
263. Stevens, supra note 9, at 11.
264. Emmerson, Frayne & Love, supra note 10, at 39.
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global financial crisis of 2008, in which governments have been required
to spend unprecedented levels of public funds to support banks, mortgage institutions, and credit markets, as well to stimulate countries out of
recession, may have given governments some flexibility to operate with
significant fiscal deficits for a period of time. Whether governments generate adequate authority to raise taxes if required is yet to be seen.
Are global transparency norms, which seem to be the goal of the IMF
and the OECD, desirable or useful, or are policies designed in one context simply being transplanted elsewhere without adequate attention to
local visions of development? Would local development or experimentation—or grassroots action—be better? Rodrik argues that institutions are
central to development, but the most successful institutions tend to be
local and embedded.265 We argue here that international transparency
norms have positive potential but that more attention must be paid to local (or national) distributional and democratic implications of fiscal
transparency. We have observed that the dominant institutional approaches to fiscal transparency tend to call for comprehensive and timely
disclosure of certain kinds of “relevant” fiscal information, so that external parties, including lenders, institutions and markets, can assess the
“performance” or “effectiveness” of government. Budget transparency
norms with only this goal may ensure accountability of a government to
lenders and donors, but a different sort of information and analysis is
called for to ensure the “effectiveness” of government performance and
accountability to local constituencies in a particular country. Regarding
the “law and development” debate more generally, Kennedy has suggested that formalization itself may be of greater benefit to outsiders than
to locals.266 Discretionary or unformalized taxing and spending powers
may operate predictably for local people, but not for external investors.
There is, of course, a danger of relativism: discretionary powers are very
likely to be applied for the benefit of only some local participants, in a
way that discriminates against the less powerful and less well resourced
in a national economy, such as a rural underclass, urban factory workers
at the mercy of footloose industries, or women. Nonetheless, as noted by
Kennedy, it is important to acknowledge squarely the politics embedded
in apparently neutral standards and procedural norms.267
A related question is whether the transfer of such global transparency
norms across borders challenges national control over economic policy.
Fiscal policies are classically the domain of national governments, a core
265. See RODRIK, supra note 112.
266. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 22.
267. Id.
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element of the sovereign State. In particular (but not only) for developing
countries, however, tax and spending policies are increasingly formulated at a global level, utilizing expertise in international and regional
institutions. In the era of globalization, the “fiscal compact” must be understood as traversing national boundaries. It concerns both the relationship between a national government (or other levels of government) and
citizens in that country, and the relationship of the government and these
citizens with other countries and organizations in the international
sphere. In this broad sense, the “fiscal compact” encompasses all elements of a government budget, including taxes, spending, aid, debt, and
the political and institutional arrangements necessary to sustain equitable
development through the budget.
Recently, various commentators have begun to envisage what global
governance might look like.268 Tax scholars have envisaged various
means of collecting and distributing tax revenues at the global level, either through the establishment of an international tax organization that
would enable significantly enhanced cooperation and sharing among
countries, or even through an international tax.269 As discussed with respect to tax expenditures, above, international coordination is argued by
many to be essential to stop harmful tax competition with respect to corporate tax incentives. International tax policy literature has debated the
problem of how to increase multilateral coordination in a manner consistent with international equity.270 As outlined above, there has also been a
significant increase in cooperation regarding the delivery of aid and the
implementation of lending—on one level, this is the “transfer” element
of a nascent global tax system.
Increased fiscal transparency at a country level is likely to enhance a
country’s domestic political and social fiscal compact, which is negotiated at national, provincial, and local levels of government. At present,
fiscal transparency rules and norms tend to enhance accountability of
national governments, especially those of developing countries, to external lenders and donors rather than to the domestic polity. We argue that
national budgets remain the centerpiece for establishing a sustainable
268. RODRIK, supra note 112, at 211–12 (putting forth an idealistic vision of global
fiscal federalism).
269. Avi-Yonah, supra note 196; Jinyan Li, Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation, 50 CANADIAN TAX J. 823, 844 (2002); Vito
Tanzi, The Impact of Globalization on Taxation, 52 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 338, 338–43 (1998).
270. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis
of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1648–51 (2000); Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAX L. REV. 83, 89 (2007).
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fiscal compact for development. New developments in international aid
that link it to the budget process seek, however imperfectly, to integrate
the global and national dimensions of the fiscal compact by engaging
international agencies, donors, and recipients in budget policy making.
This is promising because the budget process provides a space for contesting the distributive and other consequences of taxing and spending.
One difficult question, though, is how a country’s budget process can
handle so many different policy goals and stakeholders in an effective
manner.
In conclusion, we find that global norms of fiscal transparency have
been developed through a complex interaction of international and domestic processes, public and private actors, and soft and hard legal
forms. While there is an obvious pattern of norm transfer from international agencies to the domestic level, the reverse has also occurred. Certain developed countries have been especially influential in defining
what constitutes best practice, and this points to a concern about the implications of simply transplanting these norms around the world without
adequate attention to local priorities and stages of development. Furthermore, the distinction between soft and hard law is often blurry. Informal norms may have de facto enforcement mechanisms having to do
with market credibility and access to loans, thus giving them some characteristics of hard law for developing countries. Conversely, domestic
fiscal transparency legislation may take the form of hard law, but its
power may be primarily symbolic and contingent on the strength of domestic institutions, making it similar to soft law.
Global fiscal transparency norms may be an important pillar in a global
fiscal framework that links citizens, local and national governments, and
international institutions. This pillar could comprise a first step in metaregulation of a global fiscal federation.271 It may also be combined with a
move in many sectors, but pushed primarily by NGOs, towards establishing increased transparency and accountability in the international financial institutions and other agencies with respect to their policy prescriptions and funding choices.272 The IMF and other organizations are
increasingly engaging directly with civil society as well as with governments.273 On one level, this engagement is aimed at improving the
processes and outcomes of these agencies’ activities; for example, a fair271. RODRIK, supra note 112, at 114, 148.
272. See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 48–51 (2004).
273. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GUIDE FOR STAFF RELATIONS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002110/
IMF_Civil-society_Oct2003.pdf.

2009]

FISCAL TRANSPARENCY

859

ly widespread consultation took place with respect to the revision of the
2007 IMF Code. On another level, this engagement is aimed at increasing the legitimacy of the IFIs themselves in the face of public opposition
to organizational policies. As Ben Thirkill-White explains, however, this
involves agencies such as the IMF in an inevitably political process and
therefore sits uneasily with their current technocratic function of managing global stability.274
This Article calls for carefully balancing these goals with the promotion of a meaningful and inclusive fiscal politics at the domestic level.
Budgeting remains primarily an activity of nation states. A particular
fiscal bargain between growth- and equity-promoting policies needs domestic support in order to gain traction. Our study draws attention to the
equal importance of domestic budget processes and institutions in generating the political support needed for fiscal reforms, including any new
forms of transnational cooperation.

274. Ben Thirkell-White, The International Monetary Fund and Civil Society, 9 NEW
POL. ECON. 251 (2004).

